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2Summary
Rights issues are a common way to raise equity in the Scandinavian market (Norway, Sweden
and Denmark). We have investigated underwritten rights issues in the Scandinavian countries
for the period 2002-2010. Our full sample consists of 101 rights issues. The focus of this
thesis is to examine the relationship between risk and reward relating to underwriting services
and possible differences within Scandinavia. Based on the suggestion of Galai and Schneller
(1978) we have assessed the value of the underwriting service using option pricing
framework.
Based on our analyses we found that the underwriting fee charged in the Scandinavian market
produces excess returns to the underwriters. The mean underwriting fee charged is proven to
be 3.58 %. The underwriters earned on average an excess return of 2.72 %. This means that
on average 76 % of the underwriting fee is excess return to the underwriter.
The highest degree of mispricing we observed in the Swedish market, where excess returns to
the underwriter are 3.63 %. Norway seems to have the most efficiently priced underwriting
market.
The average put values in the Scandinavian market are similar to that of previous research and
the higher excess return, ceteris paribus, must thus be explained by higher underwriting fees.
We also had a qualitative approximation to our problem where we interview three investors
and three banks. In general it appears that investors and banks have many of the same
thoughts in the questions asked regarding the risk and pricing of the underwriting fee.
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91. Introduction
Rights issues are a common way to raise equity in Europe. In a rights issue the current
shareholders are given a right to buy their pro rata share of the new issued shares at a
discounted price. The right is a short lived option contract between the shareholder and the
company, known as a warrant. The major difference between an option and a warrant is that
if the warrant is exercised the issue price accrues to the company. Hence the company issues
new shares and the number of outstanding shares is changes.
The shareholder is not obliged to exercise the right. The rational shareholder will take up
their right as long as the share price in the market is higher than the discounted price. The
risk left for the company is that the issue is not fully subscribed if the share price falls below
the issue price. To hedge this risk the company can buy insurance from an underwriter. The
underwriter guarantees to subscribe for a pre-determined amount of the offered in case of a
shortfall. For this service the underwriter charges a fee; this fee is known as the underwriting
fee.
The issuing company can perceive the underwriter fee as a put premium. The company is
buying an option to sell shares to the underwriter if the rights holders do not subscribe for new
shares. This option is referred to as the underwriters put. Galai & Schneller (1978) presented
a framework that allows us to assess the value of the underwriters put using option pricing
framework. The underwriting fee should reflect the risk of a shortfall. Any mispricing
between the theoretical underwriters put value and the fee charged is therefore excess return
for the underwriter.
Typical underwriters are banks and large shareholders. Recent years after financial
breakdown in 2008 bank bonuses have been an issue in both media and politics. It is
tempting to ask the question; where do these excess returns come from? We do not believe
that the underwriting fee stands for all of the banks excess return, but there might be a trend
that investment banking divisions charges too much for some of their services. Therefore is it
interesting to investigate the pricing of the underwriter service further.
We have collected data from the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish market in the period 2002-
2010 to evaluate the underwriters put values in underwritten rights issues. A total of 278
prospectuses were collected. 101 observations fulfilled our requirements in order to assess




First of all it is interesting to see if these excess returns related to underwriting also exists in
the Scandinavian market. And if so, how can they it be explained? Rights issues are a
common way to raise new equity in the Scandinavian region. Due to the efficiency of today’s
communication technology one may assume that the findings internationally should correlate
with our finding. Comparing our findings for the Scandinavian region with internationally
findings allows us to investigate if there is such connection.
It is also interesting to investigate the risk/reward perspective in the underwriters put. The
option pricing framework allows us to apply a risk measurement as input and analyze the
theoretical risk versus the actual reward. Risk is one of the most uncertain measurements in
the economic world, a fact that the market crash in 2008 taught us the hard way. Volatility in
the market changed dramatically and the risk measurements were impossible to trust.
Both investigating the excess returns and the risk/reward perspective are classical issues in
economics. Investigating these topics further is something that it is always interesting, and
we hope we can contribute to the understanding of these issues.
1.2. Existing research
Several international studies have been conducted on underwriting fees and relating problems.
We have found reports valuing UK, US, Australian, Japanese and New Zealand underwriting
agreements.
Paul Marsh used the Black and Scholes model in 1980 to valuate underwritings fees in the
UK for the period 1962-1975. According to Marsh rights issues were a popular way to raise
equity in the UK market: “UK companies raise virtually all of their new equity capital via
rights issue.” Marsh found strong evidence that the underwriting fees in UK were
considerable overpriced. Marsh also investigated a small sample from the US market; the
overpricing was even more marked here. (Marsh, Valuation of Underwriting Agreements for
UK Rights Issues, 1980)
In 1998 Paul Marsh wrote a new article about underwriting fees. The data was collected from
1986 to 1996 and consist of 946 underwritten rights issues in the UK market. He found that
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the sub-underwriters earned excess mean value-weighted return of 1.06 % of the issue. The
mean value-weighted fee was 1.43 %. In the period sub-underwriters earned £600 million
(1.06 % of total raised money in the period). The stock market crash in 1987 is part of the
sample. Taking the stock market crash into account, the sub-underwriters still earned an
excess return of 0.9 %. This is also a considerable amount of the average value-weighted fee
of 1.43 %. (Marsh, Subunderwriting of rights issues: a faillure of competition?, 1998)
John C. Handley wrote an article in 1995 “The Pricing of Underwriting Risk in Relation to
Australian Rights Issues”. Handley used the Black and Scholes model to calculate the
theoretical correct priced fee. In his sample, three years period ending June 30th 1993, he
found that the excess returns equaled 0.6 % of the offer price. The mean underwriting fee was
1.22 %. This suggests that 49% of the underwriting fee, on average, represent an excess return
to the underwriter. Handley used a multiple regression trying to explain the excess returns to
the underwriter. Higher excess return was found in offerings that had low share price
volatility and deeper discounts in the subscription price. The reputation of the underwriter
was also an explanation factor. Prestigious underwriters earned higher excess returns on the
basis of their reputations, but only if there was a prior relationship with the issuer. (Handley,
1995)
In 1985 Michio Kunimura and Yoshio Iihara wrote an article about rights issues in the
Japanese market. They also used the Black and Scholes model to value the underwriting fee.
They found that the mean excess return to the underwriter in percentage of the subscription
price were 1.89 %. The underwriting fee charged was fixed at 2.5 % of the issue. High fixed
costs of raising new equity have guaranteed the underwriters excess returns. At the time only
fourteen companies engaged themselves in underwriting activities and four of them were
standing for 70 % of the underwriting market in Japan. The fixed price and the limited
number of players in the underwriting market could explain the excess returns earned by the
underwriters. (Kunimura & Iihara, 1985)
In New Zealand there is a requirement from the stock exchange that all equity issues shall be
offered to existing shareholder on a pro-rata basis. In 1994 MacCulloch and Emanuel wrote
an article where they valued the underwriters put using the Black & Scholes model. They
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found a mean put value of 0.082 %. The actual mean fee charged was 0.75 % and thus the
excess return amounted to 0.67 %. (Emanuel & MacCulloch, 1994)
In 2000 Hsuan-Chi Chen and Jay R. Ritter presented an article where they analyzed the gross
spreads received by the underwriters in Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the US market. They
found that 90% of offerings between $20 and $80 million had a spread of exactly 7%. It can
therefore seem like there is a fixed fee for IPO underwriting in the US market. (Chen & Ritter,
2000)
The research conducted on underwritings fees indicates that there is consistently overpricing
in underwriting fees and hence excess return to the underwriters. Every report and research
paper we have found indicates that the underwriter charges a fee that is excessive compared to
the risk undertaken. Several of the articles we have presented used the Black & Scholes
framework to calculate the theoretical underwriters put. The different articles have tried to
explain the excess fees. Handley found that shares with low volatility and a high discounts
produced higher excess return to the underwriter. This may be because the fee is a fixed sum
and does not take this into account. The existence of fixed fees in the market is underlined by
the article written by Chen and Ritter on the US IPO market, where they found the total fees
to be fixed at 7 %.
A summary of the evidence from existing research is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of evidence from previous findings on excess return related to underwriting.
Author Country N
Marsh (1980) USA - 1,08 % 47
Marsh (1994) United Kingdom 1986-1993 1,23 % 691
MacCulloh &
Emanuel (1993) New Zealand 1976-1984 0,67 % 86
Kunimurra & Iihara
(1985) Japan 1978-1980 1,89 % 148







In a guaranteed rights issue the underwriter charge a fee. Our problem is connected to the
underwriting fee and we will investigate if the underwriter is charging the right price for this
service. We have defined our problem as:
“Is the underwriting fee charged by underwriters in the Scandinavian market fairly priced in
relation to the risk undertaken, and if not, are there differences in mispricing amongst the
Scandinavian countries?”
We will try to explain any mispricing between the theoretical put value and the actual fee
charged by the underwriter, through different analyses. Further we will analyze of
To highlight our problem even further we have conducted a set of interviews with banks and
investors operating in the Scandinavian equity market. The interviews were focusing on risk
and pricing of underwriting fee.
1.4. Structure
In section 2 and 3 the concepts of rights issues and underwriting are presented. In section 4
and 5 we present the Black & Scholes model and the warrant pricing model we have used to
assess the fair theoretical fee of the underwriters put.
In section 7 we present a random rights issue in which we explains our methodology.
The numerical findings can be found in section 8. Here we analyze Norwegian, Swedish and
Danish underwritten rights issues for the period 2002-2010.
A qualitative analysis with interviews can be found in section 9. The general findings in the
interviews are presented and analyzed with respect to existing research and our own findings.
Section 10 summarizes our findings and concludes.
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2. Raising new equity
Companies can go in the market to raise new capital. There are primarily two sources of new
capital; equity and debt. In this section issues connected to raising new equity will be
presented with the main focus being on rights issues, as they are more relevant the problem.
2.1. Issuing new shares
Companies raise new equity by issuing new shares to investors. Private companies can go
public and raise capital through its initial public offering (IPO). Already listed companies can
raise money through a seasoned equity offering (SEO). The main difference between and
SEO and an IPO is that the company is already listed when it does a SEO. Hence, the most
important issue in a SEO is that investors can buy shares in the market instead of buying the
new offered shares. If the price of the shares in the issue is too high relative to the market
price, investors will not buy the new shares. In an IPO there is no market price and therefore
the investor has no alternative price to the offered price.
There are different motivations for raising new equity. Some of the most important are:
- Cash for investing purpose – takeovers, M&A, asset financing etc.
- Change in capital structure
- Urgent need for cash – crisis
- Compliance
The motivation is important as it may affect the volatility. An article written by Bharath and
Wu shows that there is a buildup of volatility 2 years before an M&A event.(Bharath, 2006)
Disregarding the motivation, a SEO is a negative signal for investors and leads to a negative
reaction in the share price. There are several reasons to this but the most important is
asymmetric information. Table 2 below presents different SEO announcement day returns.
Private placements offerings have a positive announcement return. Eckbo suggest that this is
probably because the market believes that a new, large shareholder is positive in monitoring
the management.(Eckbo, 2008)
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Table 2: Average Market Reaction US and Internationally
2.2. Rights issues
There are different ways to raise new equity in the market; private placements, public
offerings, open offerings, firm commitment and rights issues. The different flotation methods
for raising new equity have different properties but they all have the same goal; to raise new
equity. In this section we will focus on rights issues, as this is most relevant for our problem.
A rights issue is an equity offering where the current shareholders get issued a short lived
right to buy their pro-rata share of the new issued shares at a fixed price. Hence this is a non-
dilutive issue. The price offered is often discounted from the market price. The rights
received must be sold or picked up before maturity. If the current shareholders do not do this
they will lose the discounted share price. As long as the shareholder buys the new shares or
sells their right, the “profit” from the discount is captured by the shareholder. This is of
course subject to the existence of a secondary market for the rights. The rational investor will
pick up the profit created by the discounted price and will therefore subscribe for shares or
sell the rights. This is only true if the market price of the share is above the fixed subscription
price. If the market price of the share is below the fixed issue price the rational investor will
buy new shares in the market rather than picking up shares in the issue at a higher fixed price.
The rational investors with rights to buy shares at a discounted price will pick up their shares.
The company is then only left with one risk of not raising the wanted amount of new equity.
If the market price falls below the agreed discounted price, investors will let the option die.
The company can use an underwriter and buy “insurance” for this risk. If the rights holder
Average Market Reaction(AR%) to Security Offerings in U.S. And Internationally
Type of offering: U.S. Foreign
Uninsured rights -0.59% -0.70%
(53; 1963-81) (484; 1980-99)
Standby rights -1.33% -1.32%
(349; 1963-98) (1,201;1980-99)
Private placements 2.45% 3.12%
(2,830; 1979-00) (691; 1974-99)
Firm commitments -2.22% 1.10%
(15,017; 1963-01) (1,064; 1974-97)
Shelf offerings -0.66% N/A
(1,851; 1980-03)
16
does not subscribe for their shares, the underwriter agrees to buy all shares that are not picked
up by the investors.
Not all investors act rational. In Norsk Hydro´s rights issue in 2010, DnB NOR had trouble in
explaining and convincing the shareholders to either pick up their shares or sell their rights.
Many of Norsk Hydro´s shareholders were not professional investors and did not understand
the concept of a rights issue. To solve this problem they hired DnB NOR as one of the
managers, as they are the largest retail bank in Norway with a large distribution network.
Hydro was successful in not getting negative publicity in the aftermath of the rights issue
because they managed to inform the investors properly. The fact that DnB NOR called all the
shareholders in Norsk Hydro is surprising and this is not normal practice in a rights issue.
Norsk Hydro is a Norwegian partly government owned company and were probably
concerned about negative publicity if they did not properly inform their investors, which
consist of many non professional investors. (Sparre, 2010)
Rights issues may also go bad. In 1987 Blue Arrow announced that they would raise new
equity through a rights issue. The New York Times wrote about this issue in April 2008:
“But this can be dangerous business. Way back in 1987, the Blue Arrow of the United
Kingdom financed its purchase of Manpower with a rights issue. But only 38 percent of Blue
Arrow’s rights issue was taken up, and the underwriter, National Westminster Bank (which is
now owned by Royal Bank of Scotland), was forced to purchase the remainder — at a loss of
almost 100 million pounds. In addition, two of National Westminster’s investment bankers
were charged with fraud in connection with a subsequent attempt by the bank to hide this
failure.”(Dealbook, 2008)
As showed in Figure 1 rights offering were the common way to raise equity in the US for the
period 1935-1955. A large part of this was standby rights which are underwritten rights. The
amount raised through rights is declining for both the industrial and utility issuers. For equity
offerings within the financial sector, rights issues represented 16.8 % of all equity offerings in
the period 1980-2008 in the US market. In Europe rights offering in the period 1980-2008
continued to be the dominating way to raise equity, but there is an obvious trend going
towards other flotation methods. (Eckbo, 2008)
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Figure 1: The Percentage Rights Offers
2.3. Costs
There are significant costs associated with raising new equity regardless of flotation method.
These costs can be divided into direct costs and indirect costs. The direct costs are known and
payable. Indirect costs are costs that one does not know exactly the scope of and it is not a
given that they are really there. There is not much uncertainty connected to the direct costs
because they are known, but there is a lot of uncertainty connected to the indirect costs, which
can be significant. For example if the company in a SEO gives the shareholders a discount of
10 % per share in respect of the market price, the company “looses” 10 %. If there is a large
SEO, the total discount can be significant. In a rights issue the discount is transferred to the









- Share price discount
- Negative share reaction
The direct cost in a rights issue is often presented and specified in the prospectus. This gives
us the opportunity to evaluate the underwriting fee charged by the underwriter. The
underwriting fee is often presented as a percentage of the underwritten amount and the actual
fee amount. Sami Torstila wrote an article about IPO fees, “The Distribution of Fees Within
the IPO syndicate”, in 2001. He argues that the fee distribution is becoming more standard,
like the 7% standard IPO fee. The standard contract of 20% management fee, 20%
underwriting fee, and 60% selling concession have become more common in recent years.
(Torstila, 2001)
Figure 2 shows flotation costs for both standby (underwritten) and uninsured rights in percent
of offering proceeds. As showed and expected underwritten rights are more costly than
uninsured rights.(Eckbo, 2008)
Figure 2: Flotation costs
In Denmark it is not mandatory to specify the fee distribution. The bank is often both
underwriter and advisor in a transaction. Therefore is it seldom that the underwriting fee is
stated in prospectuses from Danish companies because the banks do not want to state how
much they charge for underwriting.
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2.4. Theoretical Ex-Rights Price (TERP)
The new theoretical price for a share after the rights issue is completed is called Theoretical
Ex-Rights Price (TERP) and illustrates the theoretical value of a share after dilution. The
formula for calculation TERP is presented in the formula below (Pike & Neale, 2006). We
have included the total fees related to the issue as an extra variable as opposed to Pike &
Neale. The known total fees as stated in the prospectus would have to be subtracted in order
to calculate a correct TERP.
ܶܧܴܲ ൌ
ܰ௜ൈ ݌௜൅ ܰ௡ ൈ ݌௡ െ ܨ݁݁
ܰ௜൅ ܰ௡
Where;
ܰ௜= number of shares outstanding prior to the issue;
ܰ௡ = number of new shares issued through the rights issue;
݌௜= share price one day prior to signing date;
݌௡ = subscription price for new shares;
ܨ݁݁ ൌ total fees related to the issue i.e. underwriting fee, legal fees, management fee.
3. Underwriting
Typical underwriters are banks, but also private investors, mutual funds, management and
other investors can act as underwrites. The underwriter is guaranteeing that the offered shares
are subscribed for. The issuer uses a guarantor because they want to secure that the needed
equity is raised. The guarantor demand compensation for undertaking this underwriting risk.
As we showed in Table 2 on page 15, SEO is a negative signal to the market. The use of an
underwriter can allay this reaction. The underwriter is given a lot of information about the
company and it is a positive signal to the investors that the guarantor has faith in the issue and
the company.
The underwriter is selling (short) a put option to the company. If the share price in the market
falls below the fixed issue price the investors will walk away and the company will use their
option to sell the offered shares to the underwriter.
20
The underwriting agreement is an agreement that regulates the responsibility for the
underwriter. The most important aspect of an underwriting agreement is that the underwriter
has agreed to buy shares that are not bought by other investors in rights issues at a fixed price.
To compensate for the risk taken, the underwriter charges a fee known as the underwriting
fee. This fee is a premium paid by the company to have the option to sell the shares to the
underwriter. The fee can be perceived as the put premium. This fee varies and can range
from 0 %-10 % of the underwritten amount. An important note is that underwriting
agreements typically prevents the underwriter from selling any shares picked up in the
offering until 180 after the first day of trading of the new shares.
3.1. Sub-underwriting
The term sub-underwriter is often used in the prospectuses. This is also an underwriter that is
guaranteeing for unsubscribed shares. The lead underwriters often transfer some of their risk
by selling the risk to sub-underwriters. The fee paid to sub-underwriters is typically lower
than for lead underwriters. This way the underwriter is not taking all the risk and is selling
the risk in parts to other parties.
3.2. Underwriters put
As mentioned, the underwriter is selling a put option to the company. The fee charged by the
underwriters can be viewed as the put premium. This is known as the “underwriters put”.
Galai & Schneller (1978) presented a framework that allows us to assess the value of the
underwriters put using option pricing framework. This lets use the Black & Scholes model to
value the underwriters put.
3.3. Timeline
An important issue in a rights issue is the timeline. The timeline is important because it
decides when the risk is transferred. There are no standard timeline in a rights issue, but the
order of the events is universal. We have used the rights issue of Billerud AB in 2009 as an
example to illustrate how a rights issue timeline may look like. The dates are collected from
the prospectus of the rights issue.
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Figure 3: Timeline for Billerud AB
The first important date when considering risk for the underwriter is the signing of the
underwriting agreement. This is the day that the underwriter is legally bound to take on
unsubscribed shares; hence the underwriter has agreed on the risk involved with the issue not
being fully subscribed. The subscription period is the period when the rights holders can buy
shares. The end of this period is important for the underwriter. If the issue is not fully
subscribed at the end of the subscription period, the underwriter is legally bound to subscribe
for a pre-determined number of shares specified in the underwriting agreement. On the other
hand if the issue is fully subscribed, this is the day that the risk of picking up shares is closing,
hence the closing of risk for the underwriter. The period between the opening and closing of
the risk for the underwriter, is referred to as risk days and is highlighted with red in the
illustration.
3.4. How do firms and underwriters choose each other?
The article “Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each other” starts with the
idea that issuing firms and underwriter associate by mutual choice. Both data from IPO and
SEO underwritings were collected. The SEO data is most relevant for our problem. The SEO
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data was collected from NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq in the period from 1970 to 2000. The
results were that more reputable underwriters underwrite seasoned issues of higher quality
firms. Firms with positive earnings immediately after the SEO and firms that pay dividends
hire more reputable underwriters. Firms that have greater analyst coverage and a lower
standard deviation on returns before SEO are matched with underwriters of higher reputation.
(Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 2005)
4. Black and Scholes (1973)
Black & Scholes (B&S) is an option pricing model developed by Fisher Black, Myron
Scholes and Robert C. Merton. They were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1997 for
their work. The model is used for pricing European options. The B&S formula is given by:
ܥ( ǡܵܭǡߪǡݎǡܶ ǡߜ) ൌ ܵ݁ ିఋ்ܰ( ଵ݀) െ ܭ݁ି௥் ܰ( ଶ݀)
ଵ݀ = ቀୗ୏ቁ൅ ቀെ δ + ଵଶσଶቁ
σ√T
ଶ݀ ൌ ଵ݀ െ ߪξ ܶ
Where;
C = call option value;
S = share price;
K = exercise price;
݁ = the base of the natural log function, approximately 2.71828;
r = continuously compounded rate of return;
T = time to expiration of option, in years;
σ  =  annualized standard deviation of the logarithmic stock returns; 
Ln = natural logarithm function;
N(d) = the probability that a random draw from a standard normal distribution will be less
than d.
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Natural logarithm function (Ln)
Ln is the natural logarithm function. This is the logarithm to the base e. e is a constant
number which is 2.71828. Ln can be calculated with a calculator or in excel with the function
=ln().
N(d)
N(d) is the probability that a random draw from a standard normal distribution will be less
than d. The colored area in the figure below is the area which is less than d. The probability
for our estimate to be in this area can be calculated using a normal distribution table or a
function in excel called =NORMSDIST().(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008)
Figure 4: N(d)
Further description of the input variables for the B&S model presented in chapter 6.1: Input
variables for B&S calculation.
4.1. Put-call parity
The B&S model presented is valuing European call options. The put-call parity gives us the
relation between the call price and the put price; hence it is possible to find the put values.
The put-call parity is given by the following formula:
ܲ ൌ ܸܲ(ܭ) െ ܵ൅ ܥ
If one combines the put-call parity with the B&S call formu
valuing a European put option:
Where;
P = Put price
4.2. Payoff for options
At maturity a call option payoff is the maximum of either zero or the
price. For a put option the payoff is the maximum of
price.
Pay off for a call option at maturity:
la one can find an expression for
share
either zero or strike price less the share
Pay off for a put option at maturity:




4.3. Assumptions for B&S
B&S is only valid under certain assumptions. These assumptions can be divided in to two;
assumptions regarding the share price and assumptions regarding the economy. (McDonald,
2006)
Share price
- Continuously compounded returns on the share are normally distributed and independent
over time.
- The volatility of continuously compounded returns is known and constant.
- Future dividends are known, either as a dollar amount or as a fixed dividend yield.
The economic environment
- The risk-free rate is known and constant
- There are no transaction costs or taxes.
- It is possible to short-sell costless and to borrow at the risk-free rate.
These assumptions are not consistent with the real economic world.
Modified versions of the model can take into account the assumptions. One of the input
variables for the option price is the volatility and it is assumed to be constant. This is a crude
assumption and if one calculates the implied volatility for any given option is it unlikely that
one find that the volatility is constant. Research has given extended models that can allow the
volatility to evolve over time.(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008)
The B&S model is a simplification of the real world but empirical evidence suggest that the
model is giving prices close to the market prices of options. Many economic models have
assumptions, but the important thing is that the model works and gives prices that can be used
in real life.
4.4. Criticism of B&S – empirical evidence
There have been an enormous number of empirical tests of the Black & Scholes option
pricing model. For the most part, the result of the studies have been positive in that the Black
& Scholes model generates option values close to the actual prices at which options trade.
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Whaley tested the B&S model relative to other more complicated models that allow early
exercise. He found that these models gave more accurate answers. B&S performed worst
when the share was paying high dividends(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008).
Rubinstein has emphasized a more serious problem with the Black & Scholes model. His
point was that one should expect that the underlying assets have the same expected volatility
for all options as long as maturity date is the same. This is proven not to be true. In the
Figure 6 the implied volatility is plotted for the S&P 500 index as function of exercise price.
As showed is the implied volatility falling with rising in exercise price.(Bodie, Kane, &
Marcus, 2008)
Figure 6: Implied volatility of the S&P500 as a function of exercise price
Rubenstein suggests that the problem with the model has to do with the fear of a market crash
like that of October 1987. The further away the options are from expiration, the higher the
probability is for the options that are way out-of-the-money to become in-the-money. This
gives a higher option price. Investors are afraid of large drops in the market and put a higher
premium on this than the B&S model, thus we get a higher implied volatility for out-of-the-
money options.(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008)
5. Warrants
If a firm issues a call option on its own shares, it is known as a warrant(McDonald, 2006).
For the investor a warrant has many of the same features as an option but there are some
differences. One important difference between options and warrants is that the exercise of a
warrant requires the firm to issue new shares, hence the total number of shares outstanding
27
increases(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008). Thus there is a dilution factor for excising
shareholders. A normal option contract is between two parties and does not involve the
company and therefore has no effect on the number of outstanding shares. A warrant is a
contract between the company and an investor that wants to have the option to buy new shares
in the company at a fixed price. If the warrant is exercised the exercise price is received by
the company.
Because the strike price is collected by the firm, the theoretical value of the company’s assets












A = Asset value;
m = number of new share;
n = outstanding shares prior;
K = strike price.
A/n is the asset value for one share outstanding before the warrant is exercised, hence without
the warrant. Therefore we can calculate the warrant price in two steps. We can value a B&S
option price ignoring the dilution factor. Here one uses A/n as underlying asset and K as
strike price.  The B&S option price found is then multiplied by the dilution factor; λ.  
(McDonald, 2006)
ܹ ሺܸ ǡݐǡ݊ ܭǡݎǡߪሻൌ ߣכܥሺܸ ǡݐǡ݊ ܭǡݎǡߪሻ






λ= dilution factor of warrants 
n = number of shares prior
m = number of warrants
R = number of shares per warrant
5.1. Assumptions for using B&S on warrants
Dan Galai and Meir I. Schneller wrote in 1978 an article where they showed that option
pricing framework could be used to value warrants.(Galai & Schneller, 1978) Handley
summarized the assumptions from the article:
- The warrant issuing firm is 100% equity funded;
- The investment policy of the firm is fixed and is unaffected by its financing decisions.
- Perfect capital markets;
- The proceeds from issuing the warrants are immediately distributed to existing
shareholders as cash dividends
- (implicitly) If it is optimal for a warrant to be exercised, then it is optimal for all identical
warrants to be exercised.
The above assumptions eliminate any leverage considerations, such as the impact on
volatility, and ensure that the issue of warrants will not change the probability distribution of
future returns on the undiluted share price. (Handley, 1995)
5.2. Payoff for a warrant
As argued a warrant is a fraction of a call option. The payoff for a warrant is therefore
somewhat the same as for an option, but there are important differences. Post transaction
value of the company changes if the warrant is exercised and will affect when the warrant is
exercised. Therefore we need to adjust for this when calculating the payoff for a call warrant.
To adjust for payoff for the dilution factor we multiply by λ.  The pay off to a call warrant if 
exercised is(Mjøs, 2011):
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ܥ݈݈ܽܹ ܽݎ݁ݎ ݊ݐ݌ܽݕ݋݂ ݂ ൌ ߣכ(ܸƮ൅ ܴ݉ܭ) െ ܴ݉ܭ ൌ ߣሺƮെ ሻ
Hence we get the payoff to be the maximum of this expression or 0, since the rational
investors will exercise solely if payoff is greater than zero.
ܥ݈݈ܽܹ ܽݎ݁ݎ ݊ݐ݌ܽݕ݋݂ ݂ൌ ߣכܯܣܺ[ܸƮെ ݊ܭǡͲ]
Figure 7 illustrates the payoff for a call warrant. As one can see is this a fraction of a normal
call option.
Figure 7: Pay off from a call warrant
5.3. Is the Black & Scholes approach valid for the underwriters put?
The underwriters put are that the underwriter is selling a put option to the company. The
B&S model is valuing European options on shares that are already issued and the contract has
no effect on the company`s equity.
Galai and Schneller wrote an article where they argued that under the assumptions mentioned
the B&S model can be used to value warrants, like presented by us. They showed a warrant's
rate of return to be fully correlated with the rate of return of an option with similar terms
which is written on an identical firm but without warrants.(Galai & Schneller, 1978)
We believe that the work of Galai and Schneller is valid and will therefore use the B&S
model to value the underwriters put.
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6. Data collection
We started out by gathering lists from the respective stock exchanges on seasoned equity
offerings from year 2002 to year end 2010.
In order to perform our analysis we had to manually gather data for the listed rights issues
from the respective prospectuses. On the way to reach our final sample we went through 278
different rights issues prospectuses. The data collection process left us with 102 observations.
Only 93 prospectuses provided all the necessary information. By all necessary information we
refer to signing date of the underwriting agreement, underwriting fee, amount underwritten,
total cost related to the issue and subscription period. All other inputs can be found in the
archive of the respective stock exchange.
The remaining 9 observations were lacking the signing date of the underwriting agreement. In
order to include these issues we made a proxy based on the average number of days from
signing date until subscription end. The average number of risk days in the sample was 49.
The median for the same sample was 47. We have used 49 risk days as a proxy for these
remaining 9 rights issues.
Further we have excluded the rights issue of Kopylovskoye AB for lack of time series data.
Kopylovskoye had only a history of 58 trading days.
We were then left with a total of 101 rights issues which we have conducted our analysis on.
The time-series data has been collected primarily from Datastream. The exception is the
Norwegian company PhotoCure, on which we used NHHs Børsprosjektets database.
6.1. Input variables for B&S calculation
This section describes the assessment of the input used to calculate the actual risk associated
with underwriting. All inputs except from the volatility are known variables.
Each put value is calculated based on the respective currency and then converted to SEK
based on the exchange rate on the day of signing.
The B&S calculations are as if the issue was fully underwritten and then multiplied with the
actual portion which was underwritten.
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6.1.1. Share price
The share price used in our calculations is the share price less the total fees related to the
issue. This is calculated as the market capitalization less total fees divided by the number of
shares outstanding one day prior to the signing date.
ܣ݀ ݆ݑݏ݁ݐ ݀݄ݏ ܽ݁ݎ ݌݅ݎ ܿ݁ ൌ
ܯ ܥܣ ଵܲௗ௔௬௣௥௜௢௥௧௢௦௜௚௡௜௡௚ௗ௔௧௘Ȃܶ݋ܽݐ ݈݂ ݁݁ ݏ
݄ܵ ܽ݁ݎ ݏ݋ݑݐݏܽݐ ݊݀݅݊ ݃
6.1.2. Strike
The strike is equal to the subscription price for new shares in the rights issue and can be found
in the prospectus.
6.1.3. Time to maturity
Time to maturity is expressed yearly as the number of risk days divided by 365 days. We use
calendar days in order to reflect the fact that interest is calculated on a calendar day basis.
6.1.4. Risk free rate
As the risk free rate we have used a 3-month rate on government bills one day prior to the
signing date. The risk free rate is gathered from the respective central banks; Norges Bank,
Sveriges Riksbank and Danmarks Nationalbank.
6.1.5. Lambda
Lambda is a key input to account for the dilution effect with respect to the offering of new
shares. The lambda formula is simplified to:
ߣൌ
11 + ௡௨௠ ௕௘௥௢௙௡௘௪௦௛௔௥௘௦
௡௨௠ ௕௘௥௢௙௦௛௔௥௘௦௣௥௜௢௥
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6.1.6. Volatility – five years of data
When estimating the volatility we have used time-series in the respective currency of each
country.
As mentioned the volatility is the only input variable that is not given. The volatility
represents the greatest source of uncertainty in our calculations. We have tried to gather 5
years of monthly, weekly and daily observations for all of our sample issues. We only
succeeded in collecting a full five years for 77 rights issues. The remaining 24 rights issues
did not have a full five years of share price data, due to less than five years of being listed
prior to the issue.
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the shares logarithmic returns.
Furthermore, we have annualized the volatility based on the following formula:
ߪ஺௡௡௨௔௟= ்ߪ
ඥͳȀܲ
Where ்ߪ is the volatility for the given time period in daily, weekly or monthly observations.
P is the time denominator. We use 253 days, 52weeks and 12 months for daily, weekly and
monthly observations, respectively. 253 days is the estimated number of trading days in a
year.
The table below is showing our findings with respect to volatility for the 77 rights issues with
a full five years of data. The complete table is located in the appendix.
Table 3: Average annualized volatility.
For daily observations we have analyzed 100 days, 200 days, 300 days and MAX, which is
the maximum available observations or up to five years. Weekly observations are analyzed on
a yearly basis from 1 to 5 years. The same applies for monthly observations.
100 D 200 D 300 D MAX 52 W 104 W 156 W 208 W MAX 12 M 24 M 36 M 48 M MAX
Average 56 % 58 % 58 % 51 % 57 % 57 % 54 % 52 % 51 % 54 % 56 % 53 % 52 % 51 %
Median 47 % 53 % 54 % 48 % 53 % 57 % 54 % 51 % 48 % 51 % 56 % 53 % 51 % 50 %
STDEV 31 % 32 % 28 % 18 % 26 % 22 % 19 % 17 % 16 % 26 % 24 % 21 % 18 % 18 %
Lower 25 Percentile 37 % 36 % 41 % 41 % 36 % 40 % 41 % 42 % 42 % 31 % 35 % 38 % 37 % 39 %
Upper 25 Percentile 66 % 73 % 70 % 58 % 72 % 67 % 65 % 60 % 60 % 69 % 75 % 66 % 64 % 63 %
MonthlyWeeklyDaily
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In this example MAX represents five years for all time series.
We observe from table 3 that the average volatility for the 77 rights issues is 51 % for daily,
weekly and monthly when we analyze the full five years. We also observe that the volatility is
somewhat decreasing when using a longer time-period for calculation. The standard deviation
of our volatility estimates is decreasing over time, and we believe this can be explained by
more observations and less noise. The longer time-period also has a lower interval between
the lower and upper 25 percentile. It is noticeable that the percentile interval is lower for daily
observations then weekly and monthly observations. This may be caused by the fact that the
daily volatility estimates are expressed yearly by using 253 trading days.
Based on our analysis we believe that the 5 year monthly data is the best assessment of the
true volatility of the underlying.
6.1.7. Volatility – Less than five years of data
24 of our sample rights issues have less than 5 years of trading history. Repant ASAs rights
issue in June 2007 has as little as 85 trading days. The table below shows the different
volatilities for the remaining 24 rights issues. In this case MAX expresses the volatility based
on the maximum number of observations available for daily, weekly and monthly data.
In order to assess a best estimate for the volatility for the remaining rights issues we have
established 3 accept criteria.
1. For time series less than one year, we use daily observations.
2. For time series longer than one year but shorter than 3 years we use weekly
observations.
3. For time series longer than three years we use monthly data.
Our volatility estimate used in further calculations is presented in Table 4 and highlighted in
yellow.
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Table 4: Average annualized volatility for rights issues with less than 5 years time-series data.
‘
Company 100 D 200 D 300 D MAX 52 W 104 W 156 W 208 W MAX 12 M 24 M 36 M 48 M MAX
Aerocrine [200812] 85 % 85 % 77 % 73 % 60 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 57 % 39 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 40 %
AllTele [200806] 52 % 92 % 122 % 122 % 81 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 82 % 90 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 90 %
Eurocine Vaccines [200710] 60 % #N/A #N/A 89 % #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 96 % #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 157 %
Hemtex [200905] 76 % 72 % 68 % 50 % 67 % 59 % 52 % #N/A 50 % 68 % 57 % 56 % #N/A 56 %
Husquarna AB [200903] 65 % 55 % 52 % 40 % 59 % 48 % #N/A #N/A 43 % 52 % 43 % #N/A #N/A 40 %
LinkMed [200906] 49 % 52 % 50 % 43 % 56 % 48 % #N/A #N/A 45 % 43 % 48 % #N/A #N/A 46 %
Morphic Technologies B [200810] 67 % 81 % 77 % 64 % 69 % 68 % 64 % 62 % 62 % 56 % 56 % 60 % #N/A 63 %
Nordic Mines [201002] 48 % 66 % 66 % 54 % 68 % 64 % 56 % #N/A 56 % 56 % 55 % #N/A #N/A 48 %
Nordic Mines [200806] 38 % 35 % 37 % 36 % 29 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 32 % 25 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 28 %
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum [200912] 20 % 24 % 31 % 28 % 30 % 26 % 25 % #N/A 25 % 44 % 32 % 28 % #N/A 28 %
TradeDoubler [200912] 59 % 56 % 67 % 51 % 72 % 68 % 59 % 56 % 56 % 68 % 70 % 61 % #N/A 58 %
AGR Group [200909] 92 % 119 % 108 % 75 % 103 % 85 % 73 % #N/A 71 % 123 % 92 % 80 % #N/A 79 %
Electromagnetic Geoservices [200809] 79 % 83 % 71 % 68 % 89 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 79 % 107 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 98 %
Navamedic [200709] 35 % 47 % 61 % 60 % 53 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 51 % 46 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 53 %
NorDiag [200807] 83 % 72 % 66 % 57 % 60 % 52 % #N/A #N/A 51 % 39 % 33 % #N/A #N/A 36 %
Norwegian Property [200807] 37 % 34 % 33 % 30 % 40 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 38 % 38 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 36 %
Oceanteam [200909] 135 % 143 % 122 % 87 % 142 % 105 % #N/A #N/A 96 % 146 % 115 % #N/A #N/A 108 %
PCI Biotech Holding [201006] 167 % 122 % 101 % 101 % 106 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 98 % 104 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 96 %
Renewable Energy Corporation [200907] 88 % 117 % 102 % 77 % 116 % 94 % 81 % #N/A 81 % 106 % 94 % 80 % #N/A 80 %
Renewable Energy Corporation [201005] 70 % 65 % 73 % 75 % 64 % 82 % 75 % #N/A 70 % 82 % 84 % 82 % #N/A 77 %
Repant [200910] 175 % 148 % 146 % 109 % 160 % 123 % #N/A #N/A 110 % 104 % 85 % #N/A #N/A 77 %
Repant [200806] 78 % 65 % 64 % 63 % 71 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 65 % 69 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 66 %
Repant [200706] #N/A #N/A #N/A 49 % #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 31 % #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A 21 %
Siem Offshore [200706] 30 % 33 % 39 % 40 % 35 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 37 % 44 % #N/A #N/A #N/A 37 %
Daily Weekly Monthly
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7. Example Rights Issue
To illustrate our model we selected a random rights issue based on excels RANDBETWEEN
formula. We listed rights issues alphabetically by company name and counted from the top.
The RANDBETWEEN formula returned 13, which is the rights issue of the Swedish
company Billerud AB in September 2009.
We have chosen an example issue in order to describe both the rights issue process and how
the input parameters for the B&S model are calculated. If not stated otherwise the
information is found in the prospectus.
Billerud is a world-leading supplier of pulp, packaging materials and packaging solutions with
comprehensive knowledge of the whole refinement chain, from conversion of packaging all
the way out to the market.(Billerud, 2011)
On July 23rd 2009 Billerud announced that they would raise MSEK 978 of new equity through
a rights issue.
7.1. Overview
The shareholders were given one right per old share. One right gave the opportunity to
subscribe for one new share. Thus the shareholders were offered one new share per one old
share. The issue price was set to SEK 19. The share was trading at SEK 27.02 one day prior
to the signing date of the underwriting agreement. The subscription rights were tradable from
September 4th until September 18th.
Prospectus
The prospectus was approved by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
(Finansinspektionen) and was published on September 1st 2008.
Lead managers and Underwriter
The joint lead managers were; Danske Bank A/S, Nordea Bank AB, Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken AB and Svenska Handelsbanken AB.
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The joint lead managers also acted as underwriters for the issue. In addition to the managers,
Apoteket AB’s Pensionsstiftelse, which is also a shareholder, have underwritten a part of the
issue.
Guarantee and subscription undertakings
The underwriting agreement was signed on July 22nd 2009. This date is the start of the risk
period for the underwriter.
If the issue is not fully subscribed, the underwriters are given their pro-rata share of the
unsubscribed shares in proportion of the guarantee undertakings.
In the prospectus one can find an overview providing us with information about how the
subscription undertakings and guarantee is distributed. This table is presented in Figure 8. As
shown the banks are guaranteeing for SEK 713,599,138. Each bank has agreed on
guaranteeing for SEK 178,399,784 or 18.2 % of the offered shares. One of the shareholders,
Apoteket AB`s Pensionsstiftelse, is guaranteeing for SEK 44,025,292. 77.44 % of the total
issue is underwritten. The remaining shares are committed through subscription undertakings.
Figure 8: Guarantee and subscription undertakings Billerud AB
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Cost/fees
The underwriting fee is specified in the prospectus to be 3 % of the guaranteed amount. Total
costs related to the issue are MSEK 50. The underwriters received 22,728,733 SEK in
underwriting fee; hence other fees amounted to 27,271,267 SEK. The fees related to the issue
are summarized in the table below.
Table 5: Fees Billerud AB
Overview Billerud AB Rights issue
Aspects from the Billerud AB rights issue have been discussed and important data is
summarized in the table below:






Stock exchange Nasdaq OMX Nordic (Stocholm)
Subscription Price 19 SEK
Record date September 1, 2009
Subscription period September 4 - September 23, 2009
Trading in subscription rights September 4 - September 18, 2009
Number of shares outstanding pre-issue 51,491,570
Number of new shares issued 51,491,570
Amount raised 978,339,830 SEK
Guarantee undertakings from banks 713,559.138 SEK
Guarantee undertakings from shareholders 44,025,292 SEK
Guaranteed in % of amount raised 77.44%
Fee paid to underwriters 22,728,733 SEK
Subscription undertakings 220,715,400 SEK
Underwriters
Danske bank AS, Nordea bank AB,
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB,
Svenska Handelsbanken AB and Apoteket
AB`s Pensionsstiftelse
Signing of underwriting agreement July 22, 2009
Share price 1 day prior to signing date 27,02 SEK
Total costs related to the issue 50,000,000 SEK
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7.2. Input values
In this section one can find the inputs needed to calculate the theoretical underwriters put
value using the B&S model.
n = number of shares
The number of shares prior to the issue is 51,491,570.
m = number of warrants
For each share hold on September 1st (the record date) the shareholders receive one right.
Thus the number of warrants is the same as number of shares prior; 51,491,570.
R = number of shares per warrant
The number of shares per warrant is one. For each right held the rights holder can buy one
new share.
λ = dilution factor of warrants 
The dilution factor of warrants is calculated by formula given in section 5. This gives us a
dilution factor of 0.5.
51,491,570 ∗ 1
51,491,570 + 51,491,570 ∗ 1
= 0.5
K = exercise price
The exercise price per new share is SEK 19. The share price one day prior to the signing of
the underwriting agreement was SEK 27.02. This gives us a discount of SEK 8.02 or 29.68 %
in respect to the market price.
t = time to maturity
Time to maturity is the time the warrant is alive annualized. The number of risk days for the
underwriter is the number of days from the underwriting agreement is signed to the date the




r = risk free rate
Risk free rate is given to be 0.21% per annum. The rate used was the 3 month risk free rate
obtained from the homepage of Sweden`s central bank; “Sveriges Riksbank”.
V = value of assets today
Value of assets today is the number of outstanding shares one day prior to the signing of the
underwriting agreement times the closing share price this day. The closing share price one
day prior to the signing of the underwriting agreement is SEK 27.02. The number of
outstanding shares is 51,491,570. This gives us a market cap of SEK 1,391,302,221.
Table 7: Billerud AB market cap
Fees are significant in an issue and need to be deducted from the market cap. The total fees
paid are given in the prospectus to be MSEK 50. Adjusted market cap is then SEK
1,341,302,221. Per share value after the fees are deducted is SEK 26.05.
Table 8: Calculations for theoretical per share value – Billerud
Volatility of the value of assets or equity
Historical share prices were collected in order to calculate the volatility. The volatility data
was annualized. Five years of daily, weekly and monthly data was collected for the Billerud
AB. Max represents five years of time series data. As showed in the table below the
volatility estimates varies a lot depending on the time series used. The five years monthly




Number of shares (n) 51,491,570
Before issue Changes After issue Units
Market cap. 1,391,302,221 SEK
- less fees paid -50,000,000 SEK
Adjusted market cap: 1,341,302,221 978,339,830 2,319,642,051 SEK
Number of shares 51,491,570 51,491,570 102,983,140
Teoretical value per share 26.05 19.00 22.52 SEK
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Table 9: Volatility Billerud AB
Summary of inputs
We are now ready to calculate the theoretical price of the underwriters put using the adjusted
Black & Scholes formula presented in section 5 above. The inputs are summarized in Table
10.
Table 10: Summary of inputs Billerud AB
Daily Annualized Volatility
100 D 77.9 %
200 D 72.6 %
300 D 67.8 %
MAX D 41.9 %
Weekly Annualized Volatility
52 W 90.0 %
104 W 68.5 %
156 W 57.5 %
208 W 52.3 %
MAX W 48.9 %
Montly Annualized Volatility
12 M 103.4 %
24 M 76.9 %
36 M 63.9 %
48 M 58.5 %
MAX M 53.7 %
Company Billerud AB
Subscription Price 19 SEK
Risky days 63 days
Risk free interest at signing date 0.215
5 years monthly volatility 53.70%
Number of shares outstanding pre-issue 51,491,570
Number of new shares issued 51,491,570
Rights per share 1
Number of underwritten shares 39,874,979
Guaranteed in % of amount raised 77.44%
Total costs related to the issue 50,000,000 SEK
Share price 1 day prior to signing date 27.02 SEK




Given the inputs an underwriter put value can be calculated using the B&S model and the
call-put parity. The issue is not fully underwritten. To take this into account we need to
multiply our put value found with the amount underwritten (77.44%). This is the key figures
from the result:
The theoretical value of the underwriters put is assessed to SEK 3,486,730. The actual
underwriting fee charged was SEK 22,728,733. The result gives us a theoretical overpricing
of 19,242,003 SEK or 552%. The theoretical price found is our best estimate pre transaction
given our inputs. There can be other reasons why the underwriters have charged a higher
price than the theoretical price. The underwriters are also lead managers for the issue and
possess significant information about Billeruds’s financial and operating risks. The
underwriters can also have other calculations on volatility. As showed Table 9, the volatility
estimates fluctuate when using different time series.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to conduct a sensitivity analysis we have used Crystal Ball to analyze the impact
input variables has on the put value. Risk days, risk free rate, issue price, share price and
volatility were set as input variables. The frequency table illustrated in Figure 9 below
summarizes the frequency of 100 000 different trials computed in the Monte Carlo simulation.
The full report can be found in appendix 3.
λ n/m Call-option d1 d2
Value of 1 right 0.50 1 7.231 1.53 1.30
Sum/Product: 3.62 SEK
Total value of underwriter's put - using B-S and Put-Call parity:
% underwritten λ n Call-option -S PV(K) Put:
Value of underwriter's Put 77.44% 0.50 51,491,570 7.231 26.05- 18.99 3,486,730 SEK
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Figure 9: Frequency chart from Monte Carlo simulation.
The tornado chart below shows us witch of the input variables that explains most of the
variance in the value of the underwriters put. As expected the underwriters put is most
sensitive to changes in the issue price, share price and volatility. The number of risk days is
also somewhat important.
Figure 10: Tornado chart from sensitivity analysis - Billerud AB
We recognize that the issue price and the share price are the most important input variables to
the value of the underwriters put. It is important to understand that these two variables are
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creating value to the underwriters put, but these variables are set and there is little uncertainty
connected to them. The subscription price is given in the prospectus and the share price can
be observed in the market (given that one believes in efficient market pricing). Based on this
we believe that it is more important to investigate the importance of the volatility.
When the volatility increases, the value of the underwriters put increases rapidly. In our case
the underwriters put is out-of-the-money and the put values are extremely sensitive to the
volatility. When the volatility reaches 100%, the theoretically put value exceeds the actual
fee charged.
Table 11: Put values given different volatility
If we plot the numbers into a graph we can see that the underwriters put values accelerates
with the increase volatility. Out-of-the-money options with short time to maturity are














Figure 11: Underwriters put values for different volatility estimates.
Volatility is the only variable that is not observable. Volatility is also the one of the most
sensitive variables for the value of the underwriters put. It is therefore possible that the
underwriters are charging a volatility premium. When a company is raising new equity is it
always a lot of uncertainty regarding how the market will react. In the period after the
announcement of an equity issue there might be a change in volatility, and the underwriters
will demand a volatility premium to compensate for the fact that they might be forced to
subscribe for shares in case of a shortfall.
7.3.2. Volatility
Implied volatility
We have argued that it is important to investigate the volatility closely because there is a lot of
uncertainty connected to this input variable. It is therefore interesting to analyze the implied
volatility. The implied volatility can be found by solving the B&S formula with the actually
charged underwritings fee as put value and the volatility as unknown. On can solve this by
using the “goal seek” function in Excel. We found an implied volatility of 98.67 %. The
volatility we used in our base case estimates was 53.7 %.
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Prices with different volatility
As shown in Table 9 the calculated volatility give different results given different time series.
If one uses 12 months monthly data, one gets 103.4% as volatility for Billerud. The price of
the underwriters put is then SEK 25.3 Million. This volatility is higher than the implied
volatility and hence the underwriter put is higher than the true fee charged.
In the table below underwriters put values for the different volatility are calculated.
Table 12: Volatility and put values Billerud AB
The findings in the table above are illustrated in Figure 12 below. It is it important to know
the assumptions of the volatility. The volatility assumption has great impact on the put values
and the actual underwriter fee charged is almost equal to the theoretical underwriters put if
one uses 12 months volatility data. There also seems to be a trend that no matter which time
series one uses (daily, weekly or monthly) the annualized volatility falls when one uses longer
time series.
Volatility SEK
100 D 77.9 % 12,423,537
200 D 72.6 % 10,084,449
300 D 67.8 % 8,142,098
MAX D 41.9 % 1,063,630
52 W 90.0 % 18,225,849
104 W 68.5 % 8,421,155
156 W 57.5 % 4,572,518
208 W 52.3 % 3,110,171
MAX W 48.9 % 2,320,730
12 M 103.4 % 25,299,422
24 M 76.9 % 11,945,209
36 M 63.9 % 6,699,180
48 M 58.5 % 4,869,766
MAX M 53.7 % 3,486,730
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Figure 12: Underwriters put values (MSEK)
True volatility for the period
With hindsight we can calculate the true volatility for the period after the issue. Using daily
data for the actual 63 risk days we find an annualized volatility of 43.3 %. This is lower than
the volatility we have used as our best estimate ex-ante. The only volatility found ex-ante that
is lower than the actual volatility, is the five years daily data volatility of 41.9 %. Knowing
that the volatility in the share was going to be this low in the risk period, one may conclude
that the underwriter has charged a too high fee.
We have also plotted the share price and the subscription price in a graph below. This way
we can see if there has been any risk for a shortfall. As showed has the share moved up and
away from the subscription price and thus there has been little or no risk for the underwriters
in the period.
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Figure 13: Actual share price and subscription price
Result of the issue
On October 1st Billerud AB released a press release with the final outcome of the rights issue.
50,535,616 shares were subscribed for by rights. This is approximately 98 % of the shares
offered. The remaining 955,954 shares were allocated to investors who have applied for
subscription of shares without preferential rights and who have also subscribed for shares with
subscription rights.
Billerud AB managed to raise the MSEK 978 as planned. The new shares were listed on the
OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm together with the old shares.
Summary of issue
The theoretical value of the underwriters put in the Billerud AB issue is estimated by us to be
SEK 3,486,730. The actual fee charged was SEK 22,728.733.
The different inputs were tested in a Monte Carlo simulation. Issue price, Share price and
volatility were found to be the most sensitive input variable to the underwriters put value.
The implied volatility was found to be 98.67 %. This volatility gives us a theoretical
underwritings fee equal the actual fee charged. The actual volatility for the period was given
to be 43.3% and was lower than our best estimate ex-ante, which was 53.7%.
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The issue was successful and the company managed to raise the capital they wanted without
involving the underwriters.
We have found evidence that the underwriter has charged an underwritings fee that is too
high. But there is a lot of uncertainty connected to the results and one can argue that the
underwriters fee should have been higher (ref volatility of 103.4%). The underwriting fee can
be discussed, but in the end the fee is a compensation for the risk, and risk is difficult to
measure ex-ante.
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8. Results from Full Sample
8.1. Descriptive overview
The distribution of our sample is affected by the accessibility of the prospectuses. For rights
issues prior to 2007, we found it challenging to gather the respective prospectuses as they
were rarely accessible online. We have contacted the firms from which we did not succeed in
locating the prospectus online, with various responses. All numbers have been converted to
SEK by applying the respective exchange rate at the signing date for each issue. The
exchange rates have been gathered from Norges Bank and Danmarks Nationalbank.
Our research sample of 101 rights issues are distributed as showed in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Observations per year for sample countries.
Table 13: Observations per year for sample countries.
Observations per year
Year Sweden Norway Denmark Full Sample
2002 1 - - 1
2004 1 - 1 2
2005 2 2 - 4
2006 4 1 1 6
2007 6 6 1 13
2008 13 6 1 20
2009 24 8 2 34
2010 15 5 1 21
Full sample 66 28 7 101
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The total amount raised by our sample issues is SEK 230.46 Billion, with the average issue
size beeing SEK 2.82 billion. We observe that Denmark has an average issue size of SEK 6.1
Billion. This is caused by Carlsbergs rights issue in June 2008 of SEK 38.1 billion. If we
exclude this rights issue the average size for our Danish sample is reduced to SEK 820
million. The median is reduced to SEK 576 million. We have reason to believe that the
Danish median is higher in our sample than it scandinavian peers, due to the fact that Danish
companies are not obligated to disclose the underwriting fee and thus most of the Danish
rights issues have been excluded when going through our list of prospectuses. It is expected
that larger rights issues that attracts a larger crowd of international investors are more inclined
to disclose all relevant information in their prospectusese, such as the underwriting fee i.e.
Table 14: Amount raised, median and average size per country. All numbers in MSEK.
The median size is SEK 295 million. Sweden has the lowest average issue size, but if we look
at the median it is fairly similar to that of Norway.
Table 15: Amount raised, median and average size per year. All numbers in MSEK.
All numbers in MSEK
Country Amount raised Median size Average Size N
Sweden 123 315 255 1 868 66
Norway 64 116 270 2 290 28
Denmark 43 030 660 6 147 7
Full Sample 230 460 295 2 282 101
All numbers in MSEK
Year Observations Amount raised Median Average size
2002 1 425 425 425
2004 2 4 125 2 062 2 062
2005 4 8 043 1 535 2 011
2006 6 3 896 270 649
2007 13 13 256 153 1 020
2008 20 59 254 302 2 963
2009 34 103 417 277 3 042
2010 21 38 045 272 1 812
Full Sample 101 230 460 295 2 282
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Table 15 describes the amount raised, median and average size for each year we have
observations. It is mentionable that in 2002 we only have one observation, which is the rights
issue of Hexagon AB in June 2002. In 2004 we only have two observations, thus the median
is equal to the average. For the years prior to the financial crisis we just witnessed that both
the average and median sizes of the issues are decreasing. An explanation may be that a bull
market motivates companies to go public. Shareholders may se this as a good chance to
realize the potential of their shareholdings. For the years 2008 and 2009 we observe that the
average issue size increases substantially. This may be explained by a number of large rights
issues from banks (ref. DnB NOR, Swedbank, SEB and Nordea), all exceeding SEK 10
Billion in size. The financial crisis forced the banks to strengthen their balance in order to
comply with regulations from the authorities after massive write-downs of assets.
Figure 15 illustrates how the average issue size varies in line with discount to TERP for the
years we have observations. It looks like the discount to TERP increases with the size of the
issue.
Figure 15: Discount to TERP for sample years.
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It looks like the discount is higher for periods after stock market downturns like in 2001/2002
and 2007/2008. An interesting analysis could be to examine the discount to TERP in relation
to stock returns and the cost of debt financing. Unfortunately our data does not allow us to
conduct such an analysis.
If we compare the discount to TERP with average issue size per country we do not find the
same relationship. This could mean that discount to TERP is more cyclical as we observe
from Figure 15. Discount to TERP per country is presented in Table 16.
Table 16: Discount to TERP in sample countries.
8.2. Country differences
If not stated otherwise; when calculating country differences we have used the average or
median values retrieved by the observations in each country (i.e. average pre bindings in
Denmark is calculated by averaging the actual percentages for each rights issue). We have
used this equal weight approach to emphasize the respective rights issue. Another approach is
the value weighted average which sums up the total amount of i.e. pre bindings and the total
amount raised to get the overall percentage. The latter approach will provide a more overall
picture and not allow for the fact that rights issues come in different sizes.




Full Sample 31,1 %
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Figure 16: Underwriting and pre bindings in percent of rights issue – equally weighted.
Figure 16 above shows how an average rights issue is completed with respect to underwriting
and pre bindings. An interesting observation is the big difference in underwriting and pre
bindings in Sweden opposed to Norway and Denmark. This may be explained by the Swedish
securities law which states that there shall not be paid any remuneration for subscription of
shares within the respective shareholders pro rata share of the issue. The reasoning behind this
law is based on equal treatment of shareholders. If a shareholder receives remuneration in
exchange for a subscription guarantee within its pro rata share, every shareholder who
subscribes for their pro rata share of the issue should receive that same pro rata remuneration.
8.2.1. Underwriting fee
In this section we will try to define factors that may help in explaining the construction of the
underwriting fee and why it may differ for the Scandinavian countries.
Table 17 shows the number of observations per type of underwriter for our sample countries.
A rights issue may have different types of underwriters. We have categorized the underwriters
as either a Bank or a Shareholder.
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Table 17: Number of observations for different types of underwriter in sample countries.
We observe that shareholders are the most frequent underwriter in Sweden and Norway with
shareholders underwriting 85 % and 86 % of the issues, respectively. In Denmark we observe
that all 7 issues are underwritten by a bank, and 2 of the issues have both bank and
shareholders as underwriters.
In Table 18 below we make an interesting observation regarding the average issue size for the
two types of underwriters. The average issue size for issues where a bank has provided
underwriting services is SEK 5.176 Billion. For rights issues where the underwriting is
provided solely by shareholders we observe an average issue size of SEK 1.161Billion.
Table 18: Average issue size and fee for different type of underwriters.
Another interesting observation is that the average fee is fairly similar for the two types of
underwriters and that this applies for all three countries. An independent t-test of the two
samples returns a t-statistic of 0.64. This means that we cannot prove a significant difference
in the two means. They are thus not significantly different from each other.
A problem with the comparison above is that a many of the observations have both a
shareholder and a bank as underwriters. If we consider offerings where a Bank act as an
Type of underwriter
Country Bank Shareholder Bank Shareholder N
Sweden 23 56 35 % 85 % 66
Norway 9 24 32 % 86 % 28
Denmark 7 2 100 % 29 % 7
Full Sample 39 82 39 % 81 % 101
Obsevations in %of N
Average issue size and fee for different type of underwriters
All numbers i MSEK
Country Bank Shareholder Bank Shareholder N
Sweden 4 388 860 4,2 % 4,3 % 66
Norway 6 432 1 919 2,6 % 2,3 % 28
Denmark 6 147 466 1,9 % 1,8 % 7
Full Sample 5 176 1 161 3,4 % 3,7 % 101
Average issue size Fee
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underwriter as “Bank only” and not Shareholder we get 39 and 62 observations for bank and
shareholder, respectively. The full sample mean fee seems unchanged at 3.4 % for banks and
3.7 % for shareholder underwriting, respectively. An independent t-test returns a t-statistic of
0.65; hence we may still not prove a significant difference in the two means. Based on our
analysis we can conclude that there is not a statistically significant difference in the mean
underwriting fee for bank and shareholder underwriting.
Table 19: Observed underwriting fee in sample countries.
Table 19 presents the observed historical average and median underwriting fee for the
Scandinavian countries. Sweden is by far the most expensive country for companies seeking
underwriting services, according to our sample. This is confirmed by a multiple regression
analysis where we regress Sweden and Norway as dummy variables on the underwriting fee.
The test is significant at the 1 % level.
Table 20: Regression statistics. Country as dummy variable regressed on underwriting fee.
Observed historical underwriting fee
Country Equally-weighted Value-weighted Median
Sweden 4,29 % 3,11 % 3,50 %
Norway 2,34 % 2,64 % 2,00 %
Denmark 1,94 % 1,36 % 1,50 %
Full Sample 3,58 % 2,44 % 3,00 %
Average
Constant b0 0,020 2,348 **
Sverige b1 + 0,023 2,544 **




Analysis of the Underwriting Fee







1. Results from regression model is based on
the total sample of 101 issues.
**: Significantly, different from zero at the
5 % level using a two-tailed test.
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It is uncertain why underwriters in Sweden charge more than underwriters in the other
Scandinavian countries. One explanation may be the market structure. The Norwegian stock
exchange is dominated by companies operating in large international industries, such as
petroleum, shipping and ship building. This is assumed to attract international investors as
they may contribute with proven competence from their respective home countries i.e. USA.
Another explanation may be the market concentration by providers of underwriting services.
A larger amount of potential underwriters is assumed to increase competition amongst its
services and thus lower prices. However Chen and Ritter examined the US IPO market and
found that as much as 90 % of IPOs between $20-$80 MUSD had a flat total fee of 7 %. 20
percent of this was assigned to the underwriter. Although IPOs and SEOs are not directly
comparable it does illustrate the lack of competitiveness within the underwriting fee.
Underwriting is proven to be a very lucrative business and it could be that the providers of
underwriting services would like it to stay that way.
Another explanatory factor could be that underwriters and pre-binders in Sweden often are the
same person or entity and may thus charge a higher fee for the amount underwritten in excess
to their pro rata share of the issue.
Analyzing the underwriting fee
In order to try and explain the difference in underwriting fee we will conduct some analyses
regarding the difference in our sample countries.
First we will have a look at the difference in number of risk days and volatility. We will also
take a look at the average and median underwriting fee with respect to the combined amount
of underwriting and pre bindings.
Table 21: Average risk days and volatility in sample countries.
Observed risk days and volatility
Country Average Median
Sweden 51 49 53,34 %
Norway 45 44 58,07 %
Denmark 43 26 45,03 %




The annualized volatility is an average of the annualized volatility, as defined in chapter 6.1
above.
Both the average and median number of risk days is higher in Sweden as opposed to Norway
and Denmark. The observed volatility is higher than that of Denmark, but lower than what we
observe in Norway. We believe that the risk days may have a small but not conclusive effect
on why the fee is higher in Sweden than for its Scandinavian peers. We know from our
example of Billerud that the volatility has a great impact on the value of the risk that is
undertaken.
It is expected that the lower volatility compared to Norway, would have a greater impact on
the fee in a negative matter than what the number of risk days will contribute positively.
If we look at the underwriting fee with respect to the sum of underwritten amount and pre-
bindings we observe that the equally-weighted differences lessen. For the value weighted
approach we see that Norway has the highest percentage fee with respect to underwriting fee
and pre-bindings. Pre-bindings are rarely secured in any way, but still assumed to give the
market a sense of confidence in the issue. Even though this is hard to quantify it is assumed
that pre-bindings may contribute to a lower initial risk for the underwritten part of the issue.
Table 22 illustrates how the underwriting fee evens out amongst the countries when we
assume that the underwriting fee also compensates for pre-bindings. This is based on the
assumption that underwriters and pre-binders is a registered shareholder at time of the issue
and is often the same person or entity.
Table 22 Observed fee with respect to underwritten amount plus pre bindings.
Table 23 below presents the share of rights issues that have pre-bindings in the sample
countries. It is clear that pre-bindings are more frequently used in Sweden with a total of 60
UW Fee / (UW amount + Pre bindings)
Country Equally-weighted Value-weighted Median
Sweden 2,95 % 1,86 % 2,38 %
Norway 2,24 % 2,16 % 2,00 %
Denmark 1,84 % 1,36 % 1,50 %
Full Sample 2,68 % 1,84 % 2,00 %
Average
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out of 66 rights having pre-bindings. This equals 91 %. For Norway and Denmark we observe
11 % and 29 %, respectively.
Table 23: Number of rights issues with pre-bindings.
Figure 17: Number of observations and number of issues with pre-bindings in each country.
When regressing pre-binding as a dummy variable on the underwriting fee, we get a model
which is significant on the 1 % level. The model, ceteris paribus, states that if you add pre-
bindings to a rights issue, the underwriting fee would be 1.457 % higher. The data quality
may be a source of error in the model due to the fact that 60 of 65 pre-bindings are Swedish
rights issues. Test statistics may be found in the appendix.
Further it will be interesting to test if the share of pre-binding in percent of issue size is an
explaining factor for potential excess returns with regards to risk for the underwriter. We will
test for this in chapter 8.4.
Number of issues with pre-bindings
Country Observations Pre-binding Percentage
Sweden 66 60 91 %
Norway 28 3 11 %
Denmark 7 2 29 %
Full Sample 101 65 64 %
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8.2.2. Risk days
Figure 18 illustrates the observed average fee and number of risk days in the different
countries. It is tempting to say that there is a relationship between the fee and the amount of
risk days, and that this contributes to the explanation of the difference in fee between the
countries. However this is just an illustrative graph which is of no significance.
Figure 19presents a scatter plot for the risk days and underwriting fee. The scatter plot does
not give the same indication of a relationship and a regression analysis confirms this.
Figure 18: Observed underwriting fee and risk days in Sweden, Norway and Denmark.
When we regress the amount of risk days on the observed fee we can not prove a statistical
significant relationship. The model returns an adjusted R-squared equal to -0.003 and an F-
value equal to 0.669. Further test statistics may be found in the appendix.
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Figure 19: Scatter plot presenting the number of risk days and underwriting fee.
8.2.3. Volatility
The annualized volatility as explained in section 6.1 and the implied excess volatility is
presented in Figure 20. Implied excess volatility is the implied volatility less the annualized
historic volatility.
Figure 20: Implied vs empirical volatility as descriped in section 10.1.
61
We observe that Norway has the lowest implied excess volatility and implied volatility in
total. Volatility is the single unobservable input variable and is derived from historical
fluctuation in stock returns. A higher implied excess volatility may therefore be interpreted as
a higher degree of mispricing in the underwriting fee.
Large corporations attract more international attention and are assumed to have larger equity
issues than smaller companies. Market capitalization and issue size is therefore assumed to be
highly correlated. Table 24 presents a correlation coefficient of 0.916.
Table 24: Correlation matrix for log normal issue size and market capitalization, both in MSEK.
Because the statistically significant correlation between market capitalization and issue size
we must orthogonolize them in order to construct correct regression model. This is conducted
in three steps.
1. Regress market capitalization on issue size
2. Collect the residuals from step 1 as a new variable.
3. Let the residuals handle the interaction between market cap and issue size and regress
market capitalization and the residuals on implied excess volatility.
All regressions including market capitalization and issue size are conducted using log normal
sizes on numbers in MSEK. The rights issues of Rörvik Timber in 2010 and Oceanteam in
2009 has been excluded from our regression model. Rörvik Timber has a very deep discount
to subscription price and Excel could not find a feasible solution when calculating the implied
volatility. Oceanteam is excluded because the underwriting fee was zero. The results are
presented in Table 25. The model returns an F-statistic equal to 16.09 and is thus a strong
statistically significant model on the 0.1 % level. The model explains 24.1 % of the implied
excess volatility. These are interesting findings as it may be interpreted as the fee is largely
affected by the market capitalization of the issuing firm and the size of the issue itself through




Issue size 0,916 1
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Table 25: Regression statistics. MCAP and orthogonolized residuals on implied volatility.
In section 4.4 we mentioned that Rubinstein found that out-of-the-money options had an
increasingly implied volatility for options with the same expiring date. It could be interesting
to see if the same relationship exists in our sample. A larger discount in the subscription price
reflects a more out-of-the-money option. In Table 26 we present test statistics from our
sample where we regressed the discount in subscription price on implied volatility.
Table 26: Regression statistics. Discount in subscription price regressed on implied volatility.
Constant b0 2,076 3,760 *
MCAP b1 -0,056 -0,759










Analysis of the Implied Volatility
1. Results from regression model is based on
99 issues.
*: Significantly, different from zero at the 1 %
level using a two-tailed test.
Constant b0 -2,015 -2,825




*: Significantly, different from zero at the 1 %
level using a two-tailed test.







1. Results from regression model is based
onthe full sample of 101 issues
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The model proves to be significant at the 0.1 % level. The discount clearly has an impact on
the implied volatility with a coefficient t-statistic of 6.1. Higher discount increases the implied
volatility and is thus coherent with the findings of Rubenstein. Although the comparison is
not identical due to the fact that we use options for different companies and expiration, the
findings are still relevant. Rubinstein suggests that increase in implied volatility may be
caused by the fear of a substantial market crash.
Figure 21: Excess volatility and issue size scatter plot.
8.2.4. Total costs related to the issue
The total amount of fees paid by the issuing companies to bankers, lawyers, underwriters etc.
sums up to 6.1 Billion SEK. The underwriting fees represent 59 % of the total fees paid. We
observe that Sweden has the lowest underwriting fee in percentage of total costs with 49 %.
For Norway and Denmark the total underwriting fee represents 72 % and 73 % of the total
fees paid, respectively.
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Table 27: Total costs and underwriting fees paid by the issuing companies.
In Figure 22 below we have illustrated the difference in percentage and average fee if we
assume that the fee is supposed to compensate for both the amount underwritten and pre
bindings.
Figure 22: Equally-weighted total fees in percentage of issue size
Sum equally-weighted average costs with respect to amount issued for Sweden, Norway and
Denmark is 6.36 %, 5.49 % and 5.58 %, respectively. We observe that the total percentage fee
that a company has to pay is not that different in proportion to the underwriting fee.
8.3. Time of year differences
In this section we will try to analyze if the time of year the issue takes place has an effect on
the underwriting fee. We have established a hypothesis that there is a relationship between the
underwriting fee and the competitiveness of the investors’ money, based on the number of
All numbers in MSEK
Country Total Costs UW Fee
Sweden 3 415 1 674 49 %
Norway 1 918 1 381 72 %
Denmark 802 582 73 %




issues. It is important to bear in mind that we only examine seasoned rights issues. The
distribution of issues throughout the year may be different for other issues such as private
placements, non-underwritten seasoned equity offerings, initial public offerings etc.
There is reason to believe that the fee is affected by the number of other issues that are
competing for the investors’ money at the same time. An increasing amount of competing
issues is expected to impose a greater risk on the underwriter and thus charge a higher fee.
Figure 23 below illustrates the number of issues and the equally-weighted average fee on a
monthly basis throughout our sample. We have used the date for subscription end to
determine the time of issue.
Figure 23: Number of observations and average fee per month.
We have conducted a regression analysis where we regressed February through December as
dummy variables on the average fee per month. The test returned an F-value of 1.296 and is
thus not significant. Although the test did not prove to be statistically significant it shows that
May, June, October and December has the most impact on the fee. These four months also has
the highest degree t-statistics. October returned a t-statistic significant on the 10 % level. The
statistics is not satisfying, but it is an indicator that is in line with Figure 23 above.
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Table 28: Regression statistics. Monthly dummy regressed on underwriting fee.
Further we assembled our observations on a quarterly basis. We believe this is more
representative and might provide a better explanation on the relationship between the
underwriting fee and the number of issues. Figure 24 shows the observed underwriting fee
and the number of observations per quarter.
Figure 24: Number of observations and average fee per quarter.
Constant b0 0,018 1,097
Feb b1 0,018 0,896
Mar b2 0,010 0,540
Apr b3 0,020 1,111
May b4 0,024 1,366
Jun b5 + 0,022 1,303
Jul b6 0,009 0,495
Aug b7 0,006 0,290
Sep b8 0,002 0,089
Oct b9 0,030 1,756
Nov b10 0,016 0,712
Dec b11 + 0,022 1,325
Adjusted R-square 0,031587
F-statistic 1,296526
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To test for significant relationships between quarter and fee we conducted the same regression
for quarters as we did for months but with quarter as dummy variables.
Our regression model produces an F-statistic of 4.097 and is thus significant at the 1 % level.
This is of satisfying statistically significance and proves that there is relationship between in
which quarter the issue takes place and the underwriting fee. Test statistics is presented in
Table 29 below.
Table 29: Regression statistics. Quarter as dummy regressed on underwriting fee.
Why the fee is proven to be higher in Q4 is still a question. One explanation could be that
companies with a fragile balance sheet containing a high debt-to-equity ratio are in need to
strengthen their balance sheet before year-end. Examples of this could be Swedbanks rights
issue of SEK 12.3 Billion in December 2008 or DnB NORs SEK 16.6 Billion rights issue in
December 2009. Both of these two banks had to strengthen their balance sheet in order to
comply with Basel II requirements. The rights issues of Swedbank and DnB NOR had an
underwriting fee of 3 % and 2.08 %, respectively. Both are below the average fee for
December. An explanation could be that these issues were relatively large in size and thus
may be more efficiently priced, due to competition from large international underwriters. We
will test for this later in our analysis.
Intercept b0 0,028 4,778 *
Q2 b1 + 0,012 1,677
Q3 b2 -0,006 -0,704
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1. Results from regression model is based on
the total sample of 101 issues.
*: Significantly, deifferent from zero at the 1 %
level using a two-tailed test.
**: Significantly, deifferent from zero at
the 5 % level using a two-tailed test.
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Table 30 shows the average issue size and the total amount raised per quarter. It also presents
the number of issues that raised more than SEK 10 Billion.
Table 30: Average issue size and total amount raised per quarter.
The average issue size is higher for Q2 and Q4. The amount raised is also substantially
higher, but there is also a lot more observations for these quarters. Table 31 presents the
average size and total amount raised when excluding rights issues that exceeds SEK 10
Billion in size.
Table 31: Average issue size and total amount raised when excluding issues with proceeds exceeding SEK 10 Billion,
We observe that the average size is more similar when we exclude the largest rights issues.
Another observation is that difference in the underwriting fee increases. The average
underwriting fee in Q2 and Q4 is now 4.11 % and 4.36 % vs. 3.98 % and 4.19 %, when
including all issues, respectively.
8.4. Estimated excess returns to underwriting
The observed fee less the actual put value can be characterized as excess returns related to
underwriting. The difference represents excess returns with respect to the subscription price
and may be referred to as money-on-the-street.
Average size and total amount raised
All numbers in MSEK
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average size 1 640 3 140 1 471 2 177
Sum raised 22 959 100 482 26 484 80 535
Over 10 BN SEK 1 2 1 4
Average size and sum raised amount (less issues over 10 BN SEK)
All numbers in MSEK
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average size 607 1 090 835 781
Sum raised 7 889 32 699 14 192 25 784
Average fee 2,79 % 4,11 % 2,25 % 4,36 %
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Previous research has identified excess returns in the range 0.6 % - 1.89 % for different
sample countries, periods and number of observations.
In this chapter we will try to identify if there exists excess returns in Sweden, Norway and
Denmark. Our analysis will consist of two different approaches. The traditional approach and
an approach we have called the Theoretical Ex-Rights Price (TERP) approach. The only
difference between the two approaches is the current share price input variable “S” in the
Black & Scholes formula. For the traditional approach we use the share price one day prior to
signing date. For the TERP approach we use TERP as the input variable. Our reasoning
behind the TERP approach is explained in chapter 8.4.3.
8.4.1. Traditional approach
The put values have been calculated as shown in our sample of Billerud showed in chapter 7.
We have applied that same methodology on the full sample in order to examine differences in
put values for our sample countries and if there exists significant excess returns related to
underwriting.
The traditional approach returns an excess return 2.72 % for the full sample. For Denmark we
observe an average put value of 0.09 % of the subscription price. The largest excess returns
we observe in Sweden, where the excess returns averages 3.63 %, which is 92 % higher than
for any previous research. Norway seems to be the most fairly priced of the sample countries
with the lowest excess return, 0.79 %. The excess returns observed in Norway are located
somewhat in the lower range of evidence from previous research.
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Figure 25: Put value and excess returns in percentage of subscription price.
To test if the excess returns are significantly different from zero we use a T-test.
The full sample t-test returns a t-statistic of 4.4 and is thus significant at the 1 % level. This
means that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean excess return and
the mean put value. Test statistics is presented in Table 32.
Table 32: Paired two samples T-test full sample for put value in percentage of subscription price and excess returns.
Mean 3,58 0,86 2,72
Median 3,00 0,01 2,75
Std Deviation 0,02 0,02 0,03
t-statistic - - 4,40 *
Notes: *: Significantly, different from zero at the 1
% level using a two-tailed test.
Estimated Returns to Underwriting
(as a % of the Offer Price)








Determinants of excess returns – Traditional approach
In order to assess the excess returns we have constructed a full regression model with
variables that is assumed to have an impact on the excess returns. Below we discuss our
reasoning for including or excluding supposed determinants.
Pre bindings
In chapter 8.2.1 we found that rights issues with pre bindings had a significantly higher
underwriting fee than issues without pre-bindings. In our full model we include pre-bindings
as a percentage of issue size. We believe that a higher level of pre bindings has a positive
effect on excess returns.
Type of underwriter
Based on our analysis of the mean difference in underwriting fee on page 32 we do not
consider the type of underwriter to be a determinant for excess returns.
Issue size
Smaller issues are normally made by smaller and less known companies. This may lead to a
higher underwriting fee due to the risk of a shortfall. Contrariwise as the issue size increases,
underwriters may find it increasingly difficult to reduce its risk through sub-underwriting
agreements. The underwriter may therefore be exposed to a greater risk related to shortfall of
the issue. We believe that this may transfer into higher fees and thus, ceteris paribus, a higher
excess return. We include this variable in our model, but we are not able to predict the
expected sign of this variable due to the conflicting influences.
Market capitalization of the issuing firm
Due to the high correlation between market capitalization and issue size we chose to exclude
this variable in our model.
72
Market state
Marsh (1980) argued that the risk of a shortfall in an issue may be grater during a bear market
and that the extra risk associated could require additional compensation in return of a higher
underwriting fee. His reasoning suggests that underwriters may believe that market returns are
positively serially correlated. Based on this we will include market state as a determinant
variable in our model. We have defined bear market periods in our sample to be from starting
Q3 2007 until end of Q1 2009. In addition we have also defined the rights issue of Hexagon in
2002 as a bear market issue.
Discount to TERP
A deeper discount to TERP will decrease the probability of the put option to be in the money.
This will result in a lower put value and thus a higher excess volatility. We include discount
to TERP as a determinant in our model. Discount to TERP is calculated as
்ாோ௉ି௦௨௕௖௥௜௣௧௜௢௡௣௥௜௖௘
்ாோ௉
. Calculations of TERP may be found in chapter 8.4.3.
Time of year
In chapter 8.3 we examined if there was a difference in the underwriting fee for different parts
of the year. We observed that Q2 and Q4 had a higher average underwriting fee than for Q1
and Q3. Although only Q4 had a significant t-statistic, we chose to include both Q2 and Q4 as
assumed determinants of excess return.
Volatility, interest rate and risk days
Volatility, interest and risk days are inputs to the Black & Scholes option pricing model and,
if appropriately priced, not expected to be significant determinants for excess return.
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8.4.2. Full regression model
When analyzing estimated excess returns to underwriting based on our full model the
following multiple linear regression was used:
ܧܺܥܧܵܵ ௜ൌ ଴ܾ ൅ ଵܾܴܲܧ௜൅ ଶܾ ܼܵܫ ܧ௜൅ ଷܾܯܣܴܭܧ ௜ܶ൅ ସܾܦܵܫ ܥ௜൅ ହܾܳʹ ௜൅ ଺ܾܳͶ௜൅ ଻ܾܸܱܮ௜
൅ ଼ܾ ܰܫ ௜ܶ൅ ଽܾܦܣܻ ௜ܵ൅ ݑ௜
where in respect to each issue f݅or ݅ൌ ͳݐ݋ͳͲͳ:
ܧܺܥܧܵܵ ௜= excess returns as a percentage of the offer price;
ܴܲܧ௜= pre-bindings as a percentage of the total issue;
ܼܵܫ ܧ௜= natural log of the size of the issue in MSEK;
ܯܣܴܭܧ ௜ܶ= one if the equity market is a bear market state and zero otherwise;
ܦܵܫ ܥ௜= discount to theoretical ex-rights price;
ܳʹ ௜= one if the issue took place in Q2 and zero otherwise;
ܳͶ௜= one if the issue took place in Q4 and zero otherwise;
ܸܱܮ௜= observed volatility as described in section 10.1;
ܰܫ ௜ܶ= interest rate as described in section 10.1;
ܦܣܻ ௜ܵ= risk days as described in section 10.1;
ݑ௜= error term.
Our full model produces an F-statistic equal to 6.7 and is thus significant on the 1 % level.
The adjusted R-square is 0.34 which means that 34 % of the estimated excess returns are
explained by our model. An interesting observation is that the risk free rate proved to be a
significant determinant at the 1 % level. This interprets as higher interest rates reduce the
excess return. Higher interest rates results in lower put values, and it could mean that
underwriters do not pay attention to the current interest rate when determining the
underwriting fee.
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The level of pre bindings did not return a significant coefficient and our hypothesis of
compensation for pre bindings being represented in the fee may therefore not be valid.
Table 33: Results from full regression model analyzing estimated excess returns to underwriting.
The size of the issue returned a negative coefficient significant on the 1 % level. This means
that larger issues produce a lower excess return to the underwriter than smaller issues. Our
full model favors the latter of our discussion regarding reduced level of sub underwriting for
larger issues vs. risk of shortfall for smaller issues by lesser known companies.
If the market is in a bear state as we have defined it the excess returns will be higher than for a
normal or bull market state. It returned a positive sign as expected a priori. The risk of a
shortfall is assumed to be higher in a bear market due to fear amongst investors.
Constant b0 0,049 2,583 **
Pre Bindings b1 + -0,009 -1,370
Issue Size b2 ? -0,005 -3,192 *
MARKET b3 + 0,016 2,003 **
Discount to TERP b4 + 0,102 5,414 *
Q2 b5 + 0,011 1,682
Q4 b6 + 0,010 1,611
Volatility b7 nil -0,023 -1,577
Risk free rate b8 nil -0,573 -2,673 *




Analysis of Estimated Excess Returns to Underwriting
(as a % of the offer price)
1. Results from regression model is based on
the total sample of 101 issues.
*: Significantly, deifferent from zero at the 1 %
level using a two-tailed test.
**: Significantly, deifferent from zero at the






Discount to TERP returns the highest t-statistic and is thus the most significant determinant
for excess returns. Larger discounts are reflected in lower put values and thus a higher excess
return. Another approximation in explaining the significance of discount to TERP is that a
company desperate for new equity may set a large discount in order to attract the necessary
capital.
8.4.3. Theoretical Ex-Rights Price (TERP) approach
In this chapter we replace the actual observed share price with TERP when calculating the put
values. Market efficiency theory states that the share market price is always correct. When
entering forward contracts on a share the forward value equals today’s share price less
dividends plus accrued interest. This is assumed to be the theoretical correct price at time of
maturity for the contract if we assume that there is no fluctuation in share price related to
asymmetric information, announcement of issue and other issues that may affect the share
price in relation to the rights issue.
In the case of a rights issue we possess additional information that we know would affect the
value of the issuing firm and the per share value. The reasoning for using TERP is that at time
of maturity of the option the theoretical correct price is the TERP.
Figure 26: Put value and excess returns in percentage of subscription price – TERP approach.
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The average excess return for the full sample when using TERP is 2.39 %. For the traditional
approach we observed excess returns of 2.72 %. The TERP approach reduces the estimated
excess return with 0.33 percentage points due to increased put values. A paired two sample t-
test confirms the reduction in excess return with a test statistic of 2.36 and is thus significant
at the 5 % level. The test statistic for this t-test is lower than for the traditional approach
where we observed a t-statistic of 4.4. For Norway we observe that the excess return
decreases to 0.36 % and is thus lower than for any evidence from previous research.
Table 34: Paired two samples T-test full sample for put value in percentage of subscription price and excess returns
using TERP approach.
Mean 3,58 1,21 2,39
Median 3,00 0,19 2,60
Std Deviation 0,02 0,02 0,03
t-statistic - - -2,36 **
Notes:
Estimated Returns to Underwriting







Test for mean excess return:
**: Significantly, different from zero at
the 5 % level using a two-tailed test.
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Determinants of excess returns – TERP approach
The test statistics from regressing the same explanatory variables as for the traditional
approach on the estimated excess returns observed when using TERP as S is presented in
Table 35 below.
Table 35: Results from full regression model analyzing estimated excess returns to underwriting when TERP is S.
Our full model when using TERP as S returns a higher F-statistic than for the traditional
approach. The variable that proved to be significant in the traditional approach is also
significant in our TERP model. In addition we observe that volatility and the number of risk
days return significant coefficients at the 5 % level. The adjusted R-square rises to 0.395 from
0.341 and is thus explaining a larger portion of the estimated excess returns than the full
model for the traditional approach.
Constant b0 0,051 2,660 *
Pre Bindings b1 + -0,007 -1,080
Issue Size b2 ? -0,005 -3,053 *
MARKET b3 + 0,016 1,989 **
Discount to TERP b4 + 0,116 6,080 *
Q2 b5 + 0,010 1,531
Q4 b6 + 0,010 1,573
Volatility b7 nil -0,037 -2,480 **
Risk free rate b8 nil -0,589 -2,703 *
Risk Days b9 nil 0,000 -2,168 **
Adjusted R-square 0,395
F-statistic 8,251
Notes: 1. Results from regression model is based on
the total sample of 101 issues.
*: Significantly, deifferent from zero at the 1 %
level using a two-tailed test.
**: Significantly, deifferent from zero at the
5 % level using a two-tailed test.
Analysis of Estimated Excess Returns to Underwriting







The equally-average full sample underwriter put is assessed to be 0.86 %. The value-weighted
approach gives a put value of only 0.15 % of the underwritten amount.
Table 36: Number of put value observations for given value intervals
Table 36 presents the number of observations for put values less than 1 %. 82 of 101
observations have a put value of less than 1 % of the underwritten amount. 50 observations, or
about half our sample returns put values of zero.
A simple OLS regression where we regress the put value as a percentage of the underwritten
amount on the actual underwriting fee returns an F-statistic of 0.7. The adjusted R-squared is
0.3 %; hence the put value does not have a significant impact on the underwriting fee.
8.6. Summary of evidence
The total amount raised in our sample was SEK 230.4 Billion. SEK 166 Billion or 72 % of the
raised amount was underwritten by an underwriter. The total amount of fees amounted to SEK
4.1 Billion or 2.47 % of the total amount underwritten, whereas the total put value only sums
up to SEK 250 Million. This means that 93.9 % of the underwriting fees represented value-
weighted excess return.
The equally weighted underwriting fee for the Scandinavian market in the period was 3.58 %.
The mean put value was 0.86 % and thus 2.47 % is the average excess return to the
underwriter.
In our analysis we found that there exists statistical relationships that participates in the
explaining of excess return. The discount in subscription price proved to be the greatest
determinant. We were also able to prove that there exists extraordinary excess return in Q4.
Put value < Observations %of total
0,01 % 50 50 %
0,10 % 60 59 %
0,20 % 67 66 %
0,50 % 75 74 %
1,00 % 82 81 %
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One of the most interesting findings is that larger offerings have smaller excess returns and
thus seems to be more correct priced. This is in line with our discussion about larger issues
gaining international attraction and thus increases the competitiveness.
The portion of excess returns that we did not succeed in explaining through our model may be
explained by other factors. As we mentioned in section 3, a typical underwriting agreement
prevents the underwriter to sell shares taken up in the issue for 180 days after the first trading
day of the new shares. This imposes a greater deal of risk on the underwriter if the offering
should shortfall, as the underwriter is left with the equity risk for 180 days. The ending of the
“look up period” is also assumed to be widely known by investors, and thus we may expect
additional pressure on the share price prior to the ending of the “lock up period”. This
imposes additional risk and may explain some of the excess returns we observe.
When using the TERP approach we found that the model explained about 5 % more of the
excess returns, and is thus not as much as we might have hoped. When referring to on our
analysis later in this paper, we are referring to the traditional approach. The traditional
approach is more widespread and thus better for comparison.
80
9. Qualitative findings
In this part different banks and investors are interviewed about aspects in a rights issue. The
questions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Three large institutional investors in Norway and
three large Scandinavian banks were interviewed. This is not a large sample, but we believe it
reflects the Scandinavian market, which is relatively small and consists of a limited number of
players.
The interviews are conducted in order to investigate if there is a correlation between how
investors and banks think in a rights issue. We will also investigate the possible correlation
between the findings in the interviews and our numerical findings.
The questions were divided into three sections; General, Cost/Pricing and Risk. Our
presentation will follow this setup, and we will comment on general findings. The general
questions (Part 1) were intended to map out the banks´ and the investors view on their role,
experience, the market and advantages with rights issues. The next set of questions (Part 2) is
regarding the cost and the pricing of the underwritings fee. Risk is one of the main issues
around a guarantee and questions regarding this can be found in the last section (Part 3). It is
relevant to ask questions regarding risk and find out how banks and investors relate to this.
The interviews were conducted in Norwegian and are freely translated to English by us.
9.1. Banks
We have interviewed three large scandinavian banks. These banks are all represented as
underwriters in our numerical findings and are therefore highly relevant for our problem. The
banks have been made anonymous;
- Bank 1 is a Norwegian bank.
- Bank 2 is a Swedish bank.
- Bank 3 is the Danish division of a Swedish bank.
9.1.1. Part 1 - General questions
The first question is regarding their role in a rights issue. The banks all answer that they
advise the company in the rights issue. Bank 1 states that in their home market they only
choose leading roles in a rights issue:
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“In Norway, where our bank the last couple of years has had an approximately 90 percent
share of the market, we will exclusively participate in leading positions. (Global Coordinator
or Bookrunner)”(Bank1, 2011)
The general answer to question number two is that underwriting is a cyclical business. There
are more often use for underwriting when the economy is in a downturn, like in the financial
crisis in 2008. Bank 2 states:
“Since the financial crisis all equity issues has in principle been guaranteed in Sweden. This
deviates from practice before the crisis.”(Bank2, 2011)
Not surprisingly the banks are answering that underwriting is a profitable business for them.
They run a business and therefore will not take on unprofitable projects if acting rational. Our
own findings and existing research also underlines this point.
There are different opinions concerning the competition in the SEO market. Bank 3 states:
”We do not experience a necessity to pitch in order to get appointed rights issues.”(Bank3,
2011)
The two other banks express that both the SEO and rights issue market is a competitive
market. This is also the case if the issuer wants the issue to be underwritten.
In the last question in this section all the banks answer that the main advantage using an
underwriter is that the company has secured the equity issue. Bank 1 highlights that a
guaranteed rights issue secures no speculations against equity issue.(Bank1, 2011)
9.1.2. Part 2 – Costs/pricing
From the answers it seems like there is no specific theoretical background for calculating the
underwriter’s fee for the banks. It seems like the market decides what the fee should be. The
fee is also connected to other fees if the bank holds more than the underwriting role. Hence
the total fee income for the bank is more important. This is also underlined by the next
question, where the banks respond that if the issuing company has a relationship with the
bank, this affects the fees.
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“It is clear that if the bank has had a longstanding customer relationship with the company,
fees are not discussed in the meeting. Both parties know it will be an ok deal for both
parties.”(Bank3, 2011)
It seems like there is a connection between the underpricing and the fees charged. The banks
all express that there was a connection between the underwritings fee and the underpricing of
issue. As we showed in the Billerud AB sensitivity analysis, the issue price had a large
impact on the theoretical underwriters put (48.7% contribution to the variance). When the
subscription price goes down the risk for the option to be in-the-money is reduced and
therefore the fee should be lower. When analyzing the full sample we found statistical
evidence which proves that larger discount in subscription produces lower excess returns to
the underwriter.
”Yes, a higher discount gives a lower underwriting fee and vice versa.”(Bank2, 2011)
All three banks expressed that they believed the underwritings fee was fairly priced given the
market conditions. Our own and other existing research have found evidence that the banks
are charging a too high fee. Of course the banks will not admit that they earn excess returns.
That would be the same as admitting that the fees should be lower and so margins for the
banks would be lower.
9.1.3. Part 3 - Risk
The banks have different opinions about the first question. Different banks values different
aspects. Bank 1 summarizes it like this:
”Market conditions, the company`s solidarity, investor interest and other matters. The most
central aspect will be a robust value of the rights. Good examples where this has been
demanding, are the rights issues of Sparebanken Øst (2009) and Eniro (2010), where the
underwriters was left holding shares. In this case there also were significant opportunities for
arbitrage between the shares and the warrants - which is not desirable.”(Bank1, 2011)
None of the banks sell the issue before they take on risk. They check the market conditions
and the demand for the share. If the demand and the market conditions are satisfying for the
bank, they are also comfortable with the risk they take on.
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There is of course no discount in a rights issue for the current shareholders. The difference
between the issue price and the market price is transferred to the warrants owned by the
shareholders. But as one bank points out is it important to have an underpricing to create a
value to the warrant. This way the bank is minimizing the risk for the issue going bad and the
risk for picking up unsubscribed shares. Lower issue price means lower risk for the
underwriter; hence the underpricing is important for the underwriter’s risk.
The banks have no specific guideline for a rights issue, but a timeline between two and four
weeks for a rights issue seems normal. Bank 1 comments on the fact that both the bank and
the company want a short timeline for an issue to reduce risk. But there are of course
restrictions on how fast it is possible to implement a rights issue. The average risk days in our
full sample are 49 days. This is about one and a half month, but also includes the period
before the subscription period starts.
The banks believe that it is not normal to present any form of underwriting security to the
issuing company outside the bank’s own balance sheet itself.
9.2. Investors
Three large institutional investors from Norway were interviewed. The investors are all
represented in the Scandinavian markets and have been faced with the problems and issues




9.2.1. Part 1 - General questions
The investors role in a rights issue are either as a shareholder participating in a rights issue
(investor) or/and as an underwriter for the issue.
Regarding the development in guaranteed issues Investor 2 makes some good points:
“The development over the last decade has gone from a large share of the offerings being
made as rights issues, to today being a large share made as private placements with
shareholders rights evicted.” (Investor2, 2011)
84
Investor 3 states this about the development in the guaranteed issues:
“There is a moderate demand for sub-underwriting now, because of the low volatility in the
market. There was a higher demand in 2007, 2008 and partly in 2009. ”(Investor3, 2011)
This is a profitable business for the investors. But they care about the risk involved.
“We only act as underwriter in issues where risk/reward is acceptable, meaning that the
underwriting fee is attractive in comparison to the risk taken.”(Investor2, 2011)
The B&S model that we have used evaluates the risk/reward aspect of an underwriting. Both
our own and other existing research have found evidence that the risk/reward is in favor of the
underwriter using option pricing framework.
Investor 3 does not care about the profitable underwriting business and characterize the
underwriting business as negligible for the fund. (Investor3, 2011)
The investors have different views on why they underwrite. Investor 2 is concerned about the
ratio between risk/reward. Investor 1 highlights that they do it because they believe in a
higher price after the issue. Investor 3 highlights that there are different factors to why they
underwrite; ownership, fee and other strategic reasons.
When it comes to the differences in the Scandinavian countries there are few comments on
this from the investors, but investor 1 is claiming that there is much more activity in the
Norwegian market for rights issues. The question of fee differences also remains
uncommented by the investors. However, investor 2 makes a point worth mentioning
regarding the fee:
“No, but there is a big difference between small and large companies and a big difference
between high versus low issue price in relation to price before the announcement
date.”(Investor2, 2011)
The investors are unanimously agreed that the main advantage in using an underwriter is to
secure the issue and prevent speculation. This is not surprising and investor 2 put it like this:
“A underwriting consortium secures implementation of the offering by rights issue. It creates
security for the companies for financing and avoid any speculation of the financing to fail
(shortsale)”(Investor2, 2011)
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9.2.2. Part 2 – Cost/pricing
The investors have a more analytical approach than the banks when it comes to the
underwritings fee. Investor 3 states that they use the B&S model:
”We have reviewed this theoretically, using option-pricing models. Ie. Black-
Scholes.”(Investor3, 2011)
How they use the models is not stated, but it is interesting that they especially point out the
B&S model and this underlines that the option approach is also used in practice.
The fee is not affected by the ownership the investor already have in the company. The
underwritings fee and underpricing is more important. There is a correlation with the price in
the market, the issue price and the fee.
“Yes, the lower the subscription-price, the lower fees might be attractive, seen from a
risk/reward perspective.”(Investor2, 2011)
This is in line with our findings, where we observed that a larger discount had a negative
impact on the excess return. Our Bank interviews add additional support to this.
The investors believe that the fees are fairly priced. Investor 2 highlights that guarantees
without a set issue price is costly. In our numerical sample we only have issues with a set
issue price.
”In issues which are so called guaranteed by bank syndicates, but where the issues is not
guaranteed by price, the fees tend to be unreasonably high (example: Norsk Hydro, EDB-
Ergo Group etc.). Providing a guarantee without a price should not be confused with
guarantees where the underwriter carries the price-risk.”(Investor2, 2011)
The fee can vary a great deal. The investors do not have a specific fee they believe to be
“standard”. The fee is related to the risk profile of the issue and volatility in the market.
Investor 2 is very specific about both fee and underpricing:
“1 ½ - 2% of the guaranteed amount based on issue price set at 25-30% below the price prior
to the issues announcement.”(Investor2, 2011)
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Our findings have an average theoretical fee of 0.86 %. The average actually fee charged we
found to be 3.58 %. The average discount prior to the signing date in our sample is 45 %. The
average discount to TERP is 31 %. Our findings are well above what investor 2 express.
9.2.3. Part 3 – Risk
Two of the investors did not answer the first question regarding which requirements they
demanded from the company that issued new shares. Investor 2 answered this question with
the following statement:
“An underwriting agreement, a guarantee prospect and in some cases significant and
fundamental information regarding the company which is crucial to assess the company´s
fundamental position.”(Investor2, 2011)
Requiring this information from the company is something we believe to be important. An
issue of new shares is a negative signal to the market and investors will follow the company
closely. If the underwriter is not well informed, they risk having the wrong information. If the
issue should fail, the underwriters have to buy the unsubscribed shares.
Two of the investors did not answer question 2 regarding forward selling the issue before
underwriting of the issue. But investor 2 did answer that this is not normal practice.
Underpricing of an issue is demanded to minimize risk for the investors if they are
underwriters.
The investors believe that the timeline need to be short for a rights issue. The timeline can be
affected by local regulations and laws, but none of the investors have a specific timeline
guide. We have also argued in our timeline chapter that there is no special timeline for rights
issues, but the order of the events is universal.
In question 5 all of the investor answered that it is not normal to demand security for a
guarantee outside the investor´s balance sheet.
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9.3. Investors versus Banks
Our sample of interviews is relatively small, but we think that the sample represents the
Scandinavian market and some general perceptions can be extracted from the interviews.
The investors have a more analytic approach to the pricing of the fees than the banks. The
banks operate in a competitive market and they are more concerned about the total fee income
for the bank. Both investors and banks agree that there is a correlation between the
underpricing and the fee. This is in line with our findings.
The risk involved in a rights issue is a concern for both investors and banks. Both investors
and banks believe that the timeline for an issue should be as short as possible.
Both also answered that they believed that the underwriting fee was fairly priced. Previous
research on other markets and our own research provide evidence that this is not true.
In general it appears that investors and banks have many of the same thoughts in the questions
asked regarding the risk and pricing of the underwriting fee.
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10. Conclusion
This thesis examines the Scandinavian underwriting market for rights issues. Our main
problem was to examine if the underwriting fee charged by underwriters is fairly priced in
relation to the risk undertaken.
Based on our analyses we found that the underwriting fee charged in the Scandinavian market
produces excess returns to the underwriters. The average put value was tested to be 0.86 % of
the underwritten amount. The mean underwriting fee is proven to be 3.58 %; hence there
exists a mispricing. The underwriters earned an excess return of 2.72 %. This means that on
average 76 % of the underwriting fee is excess return to the underwriter. Value-weighted, the
excess returns represents 93.9 % of the total underwriting fees paid in the period.
In our full regression model we found that the size of the issue, bear market, discount to
TERP and the risk free rate had coefficients with significant explaining power to the excess
returns. Discount to TERP returned the highest degree of significance. Several of our
interview objects emphasize the discount as the most important factor for setting the
underwriting fee.
The highest degree of mispricing we observed in the Swedish market, where excess returns to
the underwriter are 3.63 %. Norway seems to have to have the most efficiently priced
underwriting market with excess returns of “only” 0.79 %. The Danish sample is too small to
be made conclusive stand-alone and could be an interesting topic for further research if one
manages to assemble all the necessary data.
The average put values in the Scandinavian market are similar to that of previous research and
the higher excess return, ceteris paribus, must thus be explained by higher underwriting fees.
In answer to our problem we have found evidence that the underwriting fee is not fairly priced
in relation to the risk undertaken. There is also strong evidence that there exists a difference in
mispricing in amongst the Scandinavian countries, with Sweden being the most expensive
country for underwriting services.
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Appendix 1 - Interview questions banks
Part 1 Generally
1. Which role do you play in rights issue?
2. What kind of experience do you have in guaranteeing equity issues?
a. Has there been any development in the number of guaranteed equity issues?
b. Is this a profitable business for you?
3. Is the market for equity issue costumers competitive?
a. Does this change if the company is requesting underwriting?
4. What do you consider to be the advantages of using an underwriter?
Part 2 Cost/pricing
1. Do you make use of a theoretical background for the pricing of underwritings fee
before you make a decision whether or not to underwrite? If so, how is this calculated?
2. Is there a correlation between the management fee and the underwritings fee if you
hold both roles?
3. Påvirker bankens kundeforhold garantiprovisjonen og management fee?
4. Does the issue price correlate with the underwritings fee? If so, in what way?
5. What are your views on the underwriting fee? Is it fairly priced?
Part 3 Risk
1. Excluding the underwriting fee, what kind of conditions are demanded from the
company if you are to underwrite a issue? If any, the most important ones.
2. Does selling the guaranteed amount to sub-underwriters before the underwriters
agreement is signed occur in your company?
3. Do you demand underpricing of the issue to minimize the risk of underwriting?
4. Do you have a guideline for the timeline in a rights issue?
5. Is it normal to demand security for the issue outside the banks balance sheet? If so,
how will this effect the underwritings fee? (relevant for ICAAP and Basel III)
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Appendix 2 – Interview question investors
Part 1 Generally
1. Which role do you play in rights issue?
2. What kind of experience do you have in guaranteeing equity issues?
a. Has there been any development in the number of guaranteed equity issues?
b. Is this a profitable business for you?
3. Which reasons do you have for underwriting?
4. Do you sometimes enter into pre binding agreements for you pro rata share of the
company in an rights issue?
5. Do you find there to be differences in underwriters fee in the Scandinavian countries?
6. Do you find there to be a difference in the use of rights issues in the Scandinavian
countries?
7. What do you consider to be the advantages of using an underwriter?
Part 2 Cost/pricing
1. Do you make use of a theoretical background for the pricing of underwritings fee
before you make a decision whether or not to underwrite? If so, how is this calculated?
2. Does your company´s ownership effect the underwriters fee?
3. Does the issue price correlate with the underwritings fee? If so, in what way?
4. What are your views on the underwriting fee? Is it fairly priced?
5. What percentage fee is the most common?
Part 3 Risk
1. Excluding the underwriting fee, what kind of conditions are demanded from the
company if you are to underwrite a issue? If any, the most important ones.
2. Does selling the guaranteed amount to sub-underwriters before the underwriters
agreement is signed occur in your company ?
3. Do you demand underpricing of the issue to minimize the risk of underwriting?
4. Do you have a guideline for the timeline in a rights issue?
5. Is it normal that you have security for the guaranteed amount outside you balance
sheet?
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Appendix 3 – Monte Carlo report Billerud AB

































Entire range is from 5 to 161 540 555
Base case is 3 486 730






































Worksheet: [DATA2(SORT TEST2) (1).xlsx]Billerud
Assumption: Issue price




Assumption: Riskfree rate, p.a.




Assumption: Risky days (act)























Assumption: Total fees and expenses




Assumption: Volatility of return on the
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End of Overlay Charts
Sensitivity Charts
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Appendix 4: EXCEL SHEET
Company DatePrice FX RateSEK Price No Shares Paid SEK COSign date Sub. End UW Amount UW Fee Other fees Total costs RPS Shares prior S Price Pre Bind
A-Com [200905] 2,60 1,00 2,60 11 826 436 30 748 734 26.03.2009 12.05.2009 22 900 000 2 290 000 1 610 000 3 900 000 1,667 7 095 862 5,35 7 848 734
A-Com [200912] 0,90 1,00 0,90 23 652 872 21 287 585 14.10.2009 16.12.2009 18 900 000 1 890 000 1 210 000 3 100 000 1,250 18 922 298 1,93 2 387 585
Active Biotech [200702] 60,00 1,00 60,00 4 000 000 240 000 000 15.12.2006 09.02.2007 148 560 000 3 714 000 2 086 000 5 800 000 0,100 40 000 000 81,00 91 440 000
Active Biotech [200806] 40,00 1,00 40,00 3 941 676 157 667 040 03.04.2008 09.06.2008 86 720 240 2 168 006 1 931 994 4 100 000 0,083 47 300 115 54,00 70 946 800
Active Biotech [200906] 20,00 1,00 20,00 12 810 447 256 208 940 24.03.2009 10.06.2009 140 250 000 5 610 000 1 590 000 7 200 000 0,250 51 241 791 39,00 115 958 940
Aerocrine [200812] 4,25 1,00 4,25 22 984 118 97 682 502 22.10.2008 01.12.2008 9 099 998 910 000 3 590 000 4 500 000 0,500 45 968 236 6,75 78 400 002
AllTele [200806] 12,50 1,00 12,50 1 840 800 23 010 000 28.04.2008 12.06.2008 7 000 000 490 000 3 210 000 3 700 000 0,333 5 522 400 13,05 12 300 000
Billerud [200909] 19,00 1,00 19,00 51 491 570 978 339 830 22.07.2009 23.09.2009 757 624 430 22 728 733 27 271 267 50 000 000 1,000 51 491 570 38,20 220 715 400
BioPhausia [200808] 1,35 1,00 1,35 228 317 288 308 228 339 10.07.2008 28.08.2008 165 971 550 5 000 000 9 000 000 14 000 000 2,000 114 158 644 4,11 0
Boliden [200403] 17,00 1,00 17,00 84 129 056 1 430 193 952 11.02.2004 31.03.2004 692 213 873 21 000 000 35 000 000 56 000 000 0,500 168 258 113 37,80 737 980 079
Cision [201004] 3,40 1,00 3,40 74 544 418 253 451 021 14.02.2010 12.04.2010 126 701 711 4 865 345 11 134 655 16 000 000 1,000 74 544 418 7,00 126 749 311
CTT Systems AB [200712] 23,00 1,00 23,00 1 807 786 41 579 078 04.09.2007 14.12.2007 21 798 465 871 939 2 128 061 3 000 000 0,200 9 038 929 39,80 10 362 259
Cybercom Group [200906] 10,15 1,00 10,15 9 833 936 99 814 450 20.05.2009 16.06.2009 47 012 606 2 820 756 5 179 244 8 000 000 0,400 24 584 840 20,50 52 801 844
Diamyd Medical B [200910] 70,00 1,00 70,00 3 131 091 219 176 370 14.09.2009 30.10.2009 210 000 000 14 600 000 4 400 000 19 000 000 0,280 11 182 472 135,00 108 000 000
Digital Vision [201006] 0,10 1,00 0,10 354 415 408 35 441 541 16.04.2010 01.06.2010 27 495 640 2 749 564 250 436 3 000 000 1,333 265 811 556 0,22 7 945 901
Elanders [201009] 22,00 1,00 22,00 9 764 999 214 829 978 15.06.2010 20.09.2010 165 419 083 2 481 286 4 518 714 7 000 000 1,000 9 764 999 31,00 49 410 895
Elanders B [200703] 110,00 1,00 110,00 1 394 999 153 449 890 05.02.2007 29.03.2007 108 974 337 2 200 000 4 600 000 6 800 000 0,167 8 370 000 166,00 44 475 553
Eniro [200906] 5,20 1,00 5,20 484 100 000 2 517 320 000 27.04.2009 16.06.2009 1 890 687 365 76 000 000 104 000 000 180 000 000 3,000 162 271 368 10,35 626 632 635
Eniro AB [201012] 0,52 1,00 0,52 4 847 455 170 2 520 676 688 27.10.2010 17.12.2010 2 520 676 688 80 000 000 45 000 000 125 000 000 30,000 161 581 839 7,70 0
Eurocine Vaccines [200710] 16,00 1,00 16,00 1 692 500 27 080 000 12.09.2007 26.10.2007 20 500 000 1 025 000 2 475 000 3 500 000 0,250 6 770 000 21,10 1 278 384
Fingerprint Cards B [200612] 25,00 1,00 25,00 2 804 475 70 111 875 13.09.2006 01.12.2006 39 006 875 2 700 000 3 900 000 6 600 000 1,000 9 348 258 45,40 31 105 000
Fingerprint Cards B [200812] 2,20 1,00 2,20 12 152 733 26 736 013 12.11.2008 08.12.2008 15 000 000 1 350 000 2 150 000 3 500 000 1,000 12 152 733 4,80 1 900 000
Fingerprint Cards B [200910] 2,50 1,00 2,50 19 834 793 49 586 983 11.09.2009 13.10.2009 46 300 000 4 200 000 4 900 000 9 100 000 0,300 19 834 793 5,50 3 286 983
Getinge B [200803] 120,00 1,00 120,00 12 617 120 1 514 054 400 31.01.2008 17.03.2008 1 241 509 800 12 415 098 9 584 902 22 000 000 0,063 201 873 920 153,00 272 490 200
Geveko B [201003] 13,00 1,00 13,00 12 658 599 164 561 787 24.02.2010 28.03.2010 130 729 209 6 100 000 8 000 000 14 100 000 3,000 4 219 533 61,00 33 832 578
Gunnebo [200912] 16,50 1,00 16,50 30 342 239 500 646 944 21.10.2009 16.12.2009 219 784 008 4 400 000 5 600 000 10 000 000 0,667 45 513 359 36,40 280 862 935
Haldex [200912] 23,00 1,00 23,00 21 919 750 504 154 250 24.11.2009 16.12.2009 281 400 000 4 221 000 10 979 000 15 200 000 1,000 21 919 750 76,75 222 754 250
Hemtex [200905] 14,00 1,00 14,00 11 734 960 164 289 440 31.03.2009 13.05.2009 69 001 567 2 070 047 4 929 953 7 000 000 0,400 29 337 400 17,70 95 287 873
Hexagon AB [200206] 115,00 1,00 115,00 3 698 295 425 303 925 19.04.2002 07.06.2002 211 273 076 1 300 000 12 200 000 13 500 000 0,250 14 793 182 183,50 190 536 158
Hexagon AB [200604] 155,00 1,00 155,00 17 475 027 2 708 629 185 14.02.2006 12.04.2006 85 060 785 1 000 000 5 000 000 6 000 000 0,250 69 900 111 226,00 1 000 726 924
Hexagon AB [201012] 74,00 1,00 74,00 88 122 407 6 521 058 118 24.06.2010 16.12.2010 1 018 589 278 25 464 732 81 535 268 107 000 000 0,333 264 367 223 107,40 2 253 677 686
Husquarna AB [200903] 16,00 1,00 16,00 191 236 883 3 059 790 128 19.02.2009 30.03.2009 1 964 598 944 58 900 000 41 100 000 100 000 000 0,500 385 136 895 37,80 1 095 191 184
IBS [200806] 9,50 1,00 9,50 41 804 015 397 138 143 28.04.2008 27.06.2008 364 537 800 11 000 000 10 000 000 21 000 000 0,500 83 608 030 12,50 32 562 200
Karo Bio AB [200705] 1,40 1,00 1,40 232 238 383 325 133 736 26.03.2007 08.05.2007 330 000 000 16 500 000 13 500 000 30 000 000 1,500 154 825 589 4,47 0
Karo Bio AB [200912] 4,30 1,00 4,30 38 706 397 166 437 507 23.10.2009 02.12.2009 161 400 000 8 070 000 7 930 000 16 000 000 0,333 116 119 192 7,00 5 037 507
Karo Bio AB [201012] 10,50 1,00 10,50 38 706 398 406 417 174 28.10.2010 16.12.2010 225 000 000 7 875 000 12 125 000 20 000 000 0,500 77 412 795 17,90 164 024 000
LinkMed [200906] 12,50 1,00 12,50 7 300 873 91 260 913 07.05.2009 02.06.2009 60 310 188 4 824 815 5 075 185 9 900 000 0,833 8 761 048 27,40 30 950 725
Meda AB [200503] 160,00 1,00 160,00 3 514 576 562 332 160 25.01.2005 15.03.2005 267 670 080 8 000 000 7 000 000 15 000 000 0,400 8 786 440 277,00 294 662 080
Meda AB [200511] 60,00 1,00 60,00 41 791 743 2 507 504 580 06.10.2005 24.11.2005 62 687 615 1 700 000 16 300 000 18 000 000 0,667 62 687 615 137,00 1 479 427 702
Meda AB [200811] 35,00 1,00 35,00 43 177 580 1 511 215 300 13.10.2008 24.11.2008 1 119 497 365 44 792 421 10 207 579 55 000 000 0,167 259 065 485 50,00 391 717 935
Medivir B [201005] 62,00 1,00 62,00 5 243 878 325 120 436 28.03.2010 28.05.2010 212 999 999 6 390 000 18 610 000 25 000 000 0,250 20 975 515 128,50 54 753 998
Micronic Mydata AB [201005] 7,50 1,00 7,50 32 638 836 244 791 270 25.03.2010 21.05.2010 80 000 000 4 000 000 9 000 000 13 000 000 0,500 65 277 693 15,00 102 812 333
Midelfart Sonesson [200701] 13,00 1,00 13,00 17 749 166 230 739 158 14.11.2006 29.01.2007 124 203 027 2 484 061 4 515 939 7 000 000 0,500 35 498 332 24,50 106 536 131
Midelfart Sonesson [200912] 3,50 1,00 3,50 36 391 665 127 370 828 15.10.2009 14.12.2009 69 034 989 1 400 000 4 100 000 5 500 000 0,667 54 587 498 8,10 58 335 839
Morphic Technologies B [200810] 2,40 1,00 2,40 163 872 022 393 292 853 30.08.2008 13.10.2008 302 000 000 18 120 000 12 880 000 31 000 000 1,000 163 872 022 10,35 91 292 853
Nordea [200904] 20,75 1,00 20,75 1 430 059 525 29 673 735 144 10.03.2009 03.04.2009 18 921 081 868 520 329 751 454 117 762 974 447 514 0,550 2 594 108 227 42,90 11 578 691 453
Nordic Mines [200806] 20,00 1,00 20,00 5 171 428 103 428 560 29.04.2008 17.06.2008 66 644 140 4 700 000 1 700 000 6 400 000 0,286 18 000 000 30,00 36 784 420
Nordic Mines [201002] 26,00 1,00 26,00 2 327 142 60 505 692 21.12.2009 05.02.2010 50 505 692 3 282 870 11 717 130 15 000 000 0,100 23 271 428 32,50 10 000 000
NOTE [201005] 4,50 1,00 4,50 19 248 400 86 617 800 05.03.2010 06.05.2010 58 237 731 2 329 509 4 670 491 7 000 000 2,000 9 624 200 17,90 28 380 069
Opcon AB [200810] 18,00 1,00 18,00 4 081 404 73 465 272 30.09.2008 24.10.2008 35 223 192 1 761 160 3 238 840 5 000 000 0,250 16 325 619 33,50 38 242 080
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PA Resources [201006] 3,75 1,00 3,75 469 711 149 1 761 416 809 06.05.2010 16.06.2010 1 715 000 000 68 600 000 41 400 000 110 000 000 2,800 167 753 982 16,70 46 000 000
Precise Biometrics [200612] 3,50 1,00 3,50 24 305 150 85 068 025 19.10.2006 04.12.2006 78 082 900 4 684 974 5 315 026 10 000 000 0,333 72 915 450 5,50 6 985 125
RnB Retail Brands [200809] 6,00 1,00 6,00 57 078 832 342 472 992 23.08.2008 18.09.2008 213 000 000 5 900 000 5 100 000 11 000 000 1,000 57 078 832 14,00 129 000 000
RnB Retail Brands [200910] 6,15 1,00 6,15 16 308 237 100 295 658 09.09.2009 09.10.2009 38 473 414 767 000 2 933 000 3 700 000 0,143 114 157 664 6,25 1 644 849
Rottneros [200912] 0,25 1,00 0,25 901 062 320 225 265 580 28.10.2009 07.12.2009 172 332 455 10 339 947 9 660 053 20 000 000 5,000 180 212 464 2,61 52 933 125
Rörvik Timber B [201004] 0,50 1,00 0,50 499 086 216 249 543 108 07.02.2010 16.04.2010 249 543 108 20 000 000 14 200 000 34 200 000 36,000 13 863 506 9,00 0
SAS [200904] 2,63 1,00 2,63 2 303 000 000 6 056 890 000 12.03.2009 06.04.2009 2 570 846 776 89 979 637 140 020 363 230 000 000 14,000 164 500 000 22,10 3 486 043 224
SAS [201004] 0,67 1,00 0,67 7 402 500 000 4 959 675 000 05.04.2010 29.04.2010 2 105 133 903 73 679 687 146 320 313 220 000 000 3,000 2 467 500 000 2,75 2 854 541 097
SEB A [200903] 10,00 1,00 10,00 1 507 015 171 15 070 151 710 05.02.2009 27.03.2009 7 445 546 755 223 000 000 247 000 000 470 000 000 2,200 687 156 631 38,30 7 645 918 700
Swedbank A [200812] 48,00 1,00 48,00 257 686 706 12 368 961 888 27.10.2008 16.12.2008 7 320 468 912 219 614 067 180 385 933 400 000 000 0,500 515 373 412 59,50 5 048 492 976
Swedbank A [200910] 39,00 1,00 39,00 386 530 059 15 074 672 301 12.09.2009 06.10.2009 10 901 536 347 283 439 945 191 560 055 475 000 000 0,500 773 060 118 79,00 4 173 135 954
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum [200912] 15,00 1,00 15,00 100 792 632 1 511 889 480 04.11.2009 30.12.2009 1 200 000 000 36 000 000 51 000 000 87 000 000 2,000 50 911 901 57,75 311 889 480
SwitchCore [201002] 0,02 1,00 0,02 3 097 000 980 61 940 020 24.11.2009 08.02.2010 61 940 020 2 167 901 1 032 099 3 200 000 5,000 619 400 196 0,04 0
TradeDoubler [200912] 25,00 1,00 25,00 14 225 816 355 645 400 16.11.2009 30.12.2009 120 000 000 2 400 000 9 500 000 11 900 000 0,500 28 581 633 57,00 111 502 000
Trelleborg [200905] 12,00 1,00 12,00 180 714 522 2 168 574 264 22.03.2009 19.05.2009 1 424 000 000 52 455 000 42 545 000 95 000 000 2,000 90 357 261 30,40 744 574 264
ÅF Group [200608] 93,00 1,00 93,00 3 232 164 300 591 252 15.06.2006 11.08.2006 231 800 000 6 374 500 5 625 500 12 000 000 0,250 12 928 656 136,00 0
AGR Group [200909] 3,20 1,19 3,82 54 687 500 209 037 500 04.09.2009 28.09.2009 209 037 500 4 180 750 1 791 750 5 972 500 0,768 71 210 808 8,36 0
Aker Seafoods [200909] 5,00 1,17 5,87 36 000 000 211 320 000 12.08.2009 17.09.2009 187 840 000 3 756 800 939 200 4 696 000 0,740 48 646 016 8,45 0
Apptix [200803] 0,50 1,18 0,59 56 000 000 32 900 000 31.07.2009 14.10.2009 32 900 000 2 385 250 1 139 750 3 525 000 2,202 25 430 178 2,47 0
Apptix [200910] 1,00 1,19 1,19 30 000 000 35 700 000 11.02.2008 27.03.2008 35 700 000 714 000 1 785 000 2 499 000 0,309 97 150 889 1,93 0
DnB NOR [200912] 47,30 1,19 56,07 296 145 246 16 606 092 946 24.09.2009 10.12.2009 10 960 021 325 227 616 000 22 524 500 250 140 500 0,222 1 332 653 615 74,98 5 646 071 622
EDB Ergogroup [201012] 9,45 1,14 10,79 94 862 219 1 023 743 581 29.10.2010 09.12.2010 335 661 026 5 034 916 22 258 884 27 293 800 0,550 172 476 762 20,56 688 082 554
Electromagnetic Geoservices [200809] 15,14 1,18 17,87 16 512 549 294 999 990 05.08.2008 30.09.2008 294 999 991 5 900 000 7 080 000 12 980 000 0,221 74 649 860 33,75 0
Green Reefers [200701] 4,39 1,12 4,91 28 051 188 137 614 219 12.12.2006 19.01.2007 137 614 219 2 064 214 1 511 786 3 576 000 0,200 145 010 777 4,97 0
Hurtigruten [200710] 38,00 1,18 44,94 7 894 736 354 749 962 04.09.2007 11.10.2007 354 749 962 5 321 250 20 102 500 25 423 750 0,404 19 848 394 59,13 0
Kverneland [200512] 66,00 1,22 80,69 3 030 304 244 500 078 31.10.2005 19.12.2005 244 500 078 3 667 500 11 002 500 14 670 000 0,244 12 400 615 97,80 0
Navamedic [200709] 44,90 1,17 52,69 890 868 46 939 969 21.08.2007 27.09.2007 46 939 968 938 799 2 699 051 3 637 850 0,149 5 973 970 55,15 0
NorDiag [200807] 2,00 1,17 2,35 15 113 744 35 456 843 03.06.2008 09.07.2008 35 456 843 709 137 2 575 263 3 284 400 0,652 38 323 815 3,46 0
Norsk Hydro [201007] 26,30 1,23 32,26 381 053 600 12 291 626 923 02.05.2010 09.07.2010 6 956 266 362 155 397 550 29 803 950 185 201 500 0,304 1 240 110 211 56,17 5 335 360 561
Norske Skog [200510] 70,00 1,19 83,23 56 808 538 4 728 174 618 06.09.2005 13.10.2005 4 728 174 618 141 847 700 19 737 400 161 585 100 0,429 133 137 088 129,90 0
Norwegian Air Shuttle [200808] 34,80 1,18 41,03 11 494 252 471 599 964 07.07.2008 25.08.2008 471 599 965 9 431 999 10 611 001 20 043 000 0,551 20 865 526 58,83 0
Norwegian Property [200807] 26,00 1,18 30,71 96 153 846 2 952 499 995 30.05.2008 10.07.2008 2 952 499 995 59 050 000 124 005 000 183 055 000 0,912 105 481 570 41,34 0
Oceanteam [200909] 1,85 1,18 2,18 29 450 616 64 208 969 10.08.2009 21.09.2009 64 208 970 0 4 360 450 4 360 450 1,934 121 337 777 2,35 0
PCI Biotech Holding [201006] 40,00 1,22 48,60 2 250 000 109 350 000 21.04.2010 09.06.2010 109 350 000 1 640 250 5 528 250 7 168 500 0,415 5 416 390 50,45 0
PhotoCure [200602] 46,00 1,18 54,23 4 396 051 238 415 430 02.01.2006 20.02.2006 238 158 000 3 576 231 9 392 769 12 969 000 0,250 17 584 204 57,77 0
Renewable Energy Corporation [200907] 26,50 1,24 32,78 170 453 354 5 587 546 171 22.06.2009 13.07.2009 5 587 546 171 222 660 000 24 740 000 247 400 000 0,345 494 314 725 72,36 0
Renewable Energy Corporation [201005] 12,10 1,21 14,68 332 384 039 4 878 500 256 30.03.2010 20.05.2010 4 878 500 256 109 776 500 53 978 500 163 755 000 0,500 664 768 079 30,39 0
Repant [200706] 6,00 1,13 6,75 4 000 000 27 000 000 03.05.2007 19.06.2007 27 000 000 675 000 2 700 000 3 375 000 1,220 16 772 016 10,07 0
Repant [200806] 1,50 1,17 1,75 21 772 016 38 144 572 04.04.2008 26.06.2008 38 144 572 667 530 3 420 470 4 088 000 1,000 21 772 016 2,86 0
Repant [200910] 0,65 1,19 0,77 68 514 005 53 062 384 07.09.2009 19.10.2009 35 745 000 1 787 250 1 787 250 3 574 500 0,238 82 000 000 1,24 0
Schibsted [201007] 34,00 1,22 41,38 38 753 615 1 603 547 081 11.06.2010 02.07.2010 1 603 547 081 44 097 545 31 599 855 75 697 400 0,600 69 250 000 157,24 0
Siem Offshore [200706] 13,00 1,15 15,00 55 972 966 839 342 612 06.06.2007 18.06.2007 839 342 612 12 590 139 2 883 750 15 473 889 0,330 167 918 900 16,73 0
Storebrand [200712] 45,00 1,19 53,48 200 090 786 10 701 355 462 24.10.2007 10.12.2007 10 701 355 462 346 804 300 104 825 700 451 630 000 0,818 249 819 105 95,50 0
TTS Marine [200907] 6,00 1,18 7,11 42 000 000 298 494 000 27.05.2009 15.07.2009 298 494 000 8 954 820 12 010 830 20 965 650 1,621 25 908 279 17,06 0
Bang & Olufsen B [200905] 19,00 1,462 27,77 24 162 676 670 961 269 16.04.2009 07.05.2009 498 513 663 7 453 650 31 568 400 39 022 050 2,000 12 081 338 127,15 138 236 813
Brøndby IF B [200712] 60,00 1,245 74,67 1 750 000 130 672 500 26.11.2007 20.12.2007 130 672 500 1 306 725 9 147 075 10 453 800 0,500 3 855 000 108,89 0
Carlsberg B [200806] 400,00 1,249 499,60 76 278 403 38 108 690 139 15.05.2008 10.06.2008 38 108 690 139 475 869 000 72 442 000 548 311 000 1,000 76 278 403 831,83 0
H+H International [200912] 54,00 1,401 75,65 8 720 000 659 702 880 02.11.2009 21.12.2009 546 126 253 10 922 525 37 972 375 48 894 900 8,000 1 090 000 364,26 113 576 627
NeuroSearch [200610] 100,00 1,241 124,10 3 970 715 492 765 732 22.09.2006 17.10.2006 492 765 732 19 359 600 13 651 000 33 010 600 0,500 7 941 430 215,93 0
TK Development [201008] 15,00 1,294 19,41 14 021 905 272 165 176 22.04.2010 25.08.2010 197 067 478 2 956 012 12 571 988 15 528 000 0,500 28 043 810 45,94 0
Vestas Wind Systems [200406] 50,00 1,233 61,63 43 727 793 2 694 725 244 11.05.2004 08.06.2004 2 694 725 244 64 336 500 42 521 250 106 857 750 0,333 131 183 379 107,23 0
100
Appendix 5 – Pricing of underwriters Put
Company S K r Volatility T-t d1 d2 Call Put Lambda Tot Put Underwriting ratio Adjusted Put FX PUT SEK
A-Com [200905] 4,80 2,60 0,2513 % 39,3 % 0,18577075 3,70796445 3,5386011 2,20 0,00002 0,375 94,06 74,47 % 70,05 1,00 70
A-Com [200912] 1,77 0,90 0,1802 % 39,6 % 0,24901186 3,51094293 3,31322695 0,87 0,00002 0,44444444 215,67 88,78 % 191,48 1,00 191
Active Biotech [200702] 80,86 60,00 3,0310 % 59,5 % 0,22134387 1,23031815 0,9505993 22,61 1,34911 0,90909091 4 905 846,03 61,90 % 3 036 718,69 1,00 3 036 719
Active Biotech [200806] 53,91 40,00 4,2655 % 50,1 % 0,26482213 1,3303775 1,07252799 15,02 0,66229 0,92307692 2 409 714,61 55,00 % 1 325 394,51 1,00 1 325 395
Active Biotech [200906] 38,86 20,00 0,2523 % 48,5 % 0,3083004 2,60595197 2,33687607 18,89 0,01629 0,8 166 957,02 54,74 % 91 393,07 1,00 91 393
Aerocrine [200812] 6,65 4,25 3,5578 % 57,2 % 0,15810277 2,10686866 1,87925952 2,44 0,01039 0,66666667 159 138,75 9,32 % 14 825,20 1,00 14 825
AllTele [200806] 12,38 12,50 4,1967 % 82,0 % 0,17786561 0,16662068 -0,1792376 1,69 1,71510 0,75 2 367 861,22 30,42 % 720 340,22 1,00 720 340
Billerud [200909] 37,23 19,00 0,1802 % 53,7 % 0,24901186 2,6467006 2,37882965 18,25 0,01362 0,5 350 612,32 77,44 % 271 513,49 1,00 271 513
BioPhausia [200808] 3,99 1,35 4,4679 % 52,3 % 0,19367589 4,85789047 4,62771454 2,65 0,00000 0,33333333 8,28 53,85 % 4,46 1,00 4
Boliden [200403] 37,47 17,00 2,4905 % 62,4 % 0,19367589 3,03438109 2,75994885 20,55 0,00375 0,66666667 210 259,59 48,40 % 101 765,64 1,00 101 766
Cision [201004] 6,79 3,40 0,2202 % 66,3 % 0,22529644 2,355281 2,04067918 3,39 0,00735 0,5 274 013,55 49,99 % 136 981,04 1,00 136 981
CTT Systems AB [200712] 39,47 23,00 3,7195 % 64,7 % 0,39920949 1,56177766 1,15301997 17,29 0,48485 0,83333333 730 423,61 52,43 % 382 935,70 1,00 382 936
Cybercom Group [200906] 20,17 10,15 0,5013 % 45,5 % 0,10671937 4,69740167 4,5486934 10,03 0,00000 0,71428571 5,63 47,10 % 2,65 1,00 3
Diamyd Medical B [200910] 133,30 70,00 0,1101 % 62,7 % 0,18181818 2,54475682 2,27753362 63,38 0,06740 0,78125 164 860,33 95,81 % 157 958,03 1,00 157 958
Digital Vision [201006] 0,21 0,10 0,3005 % 93,9 % 0,18181818 2,039033 1,63858947 0,11 0,00074 0,42857143 111 932,55 77,58 % 86 837,56 1,00 86 838
Elanders [201009] 30,28 22,00 0,2804 % 42,8 % 0,38339921 1,34160278 1,07640592 8,68 0,37456 0,5 1 828 770,01 77,00 % 1 408 152,91 1,00 1 408 153
Elanders B [200703] 165,19 110,00 3,3716 % 37,8 % 0,2055336 2,49603023 2,32445797 56,01 0,06061 0,85714286 72 468,75 71,02 % 51 464,58 1,00 51 465
Eniro [200906] 9,24 5,20 0,3005 % 44,8 % 0,19762846 2,98880457 2,78959442 4,04 0,00077 0,25 93 526,53 75,11 % 70 245,11 1,00 70 245
Eniro AB [201012] 6,93 0,52 1,0050 % 79,5 % 0,20158103 7,43533191 7,07824667 6,41 0,00000 0,03225806 0,00 100,00 % 0,00 1,00 0
Eurocine Vaccines [200710] 20,58 16,00 3,6957 % 89,1 % 0,17391304 0,88115128 0,50972375 5,64 0,95807 0,8 1 297 220,73 75,70 % 982 017,17 1,00 982 017
Fingerprint Cards B [200612] 44,69 25,00 2,5346 % 88,0 % 0,31225296 1,44387843 0,95238123 20,79 0,90307 0,5 1 266 319,52 55,64 % 704 519,27 1,00 704 519
Fingerprint Cards B [200812] 4,51 2,20 3,4554 % 80,3 % 0,1027668 2,9339931 2,67668597 2,32 0,00060 0,5 3 650,02 56,10 % 2 047,81 1,00 2 048
Fingerprint Cards B [200910] 5,04 2,50 0,1201 % 90,6 % 0,12648221 2,33846697 2,01628696 2,55 0,00590 0,76923077 89 982,71 93,37 % 84 018,00 1,00 84 018
Getinge B [200803] 152,89 120,00 4,1446 % 21,5 % 0,18181818 2,76939878 2,67769137 33,80 0,01213 0,94117647 144 077,79 82,00 % 118 142,38 1,00 118 142
Geveko B [201003] 57,66 13,00 0,2202 % 31,9 % 0,12648221 13,1746611 13,0610859 44,66 0,00000 0,25 0,00 79,44 % 0,00 1,00 0
Gunnebo [200912] 36,18 16,50 0,2002 % 45,2 % 0,22134387 3,79714481 3,58428717 19,69 0,00014 0,6 2 537,27 43,90 % 1 113,86 1,00 1 114
Haldex[200912] 76,06 23,00 0,1501 % 53,6 % 0,08695652 7,65300727 7,49508459 53,06 0,00000 0,5 0,00 55,82 % 0,00 1,00 0
Hemtex[200905] 17,46 14,00 0,2994 % 55,8 % 0,16996047 1,07744891 0,84735344 3,79 0,32041 0,71428571 2 685 671,45 42,00 % 1 127 982,04 1,00 1 127 982
Hexagon AB [200206] 183,09 115,00 4,3729 % 24,6 % 0,19367589 4,43121036 4,32302523 69,06 0,00002 0,8 58,10 49,68 % 28,86 1,00 29
Hexagon AB [200604] 225,81 155,00 1,9487 % 28,2 % 0,22529644 2,90962502 2,77572098 71,50 0,01644 0,8 229 837,41 3,14 % 7 217,73 1,00 7 218
Hexagon AB [201012] 107,00 74,00 0,2503 % 51,1 % 0,6916996 1,08393435 0,65879584 37,07 3,94493 0,75 260 727 869,51 15,62 % 40 725 693,22 1,00 40 725 693
Husquarna AB [200903] 37,54 16,00 0,6028 % 43,5 % 0,1541502 5,08550781 4,91476102 21,56 0,00000 0,66666667 28,39 64,21 % 18,23 1,00 18
IBS [200806] 12,25 9,50 4,1967 % 40,4 % 0,23715415 1,44128528 1,24463697 2,93 0,08735 0,66666667 2 434 463,37 91,79 % 2 234 622,73 1,00 2 234 623
Karo Bio AB [200705] 4,28 1,40 3,3148 % 72,6 % 0,16996047 3,89835681 3,59898841 2,88 0,00002 0,4 1 420,59 101,50 % 1 441,85 1,00 1 442
Karo Bio AB [200912] 6,86 4,30 0,1802 % 63,0 % 0,15810277 1,99226891 1,74176248 2,58 0,01628 0,75 472 600,00 96,97 % 458 295,98 1,00 458 296
Karo Bio AB [201012] 17,64 10,50 1,0151 % 63,6 % 0,19367589 2,00196404 1,72225256 7,21 0,04602 0,66666667 1 187 393,94 55,36 % 657 363,06 1,00 657 363
LinkMed [200906] 26,27 12,50 0,4520 % 45,3 % 0,1027668 5,18906659 5,04381654 13,78 0,00000 0,54545455 0,30 66,09 % 0,20 1,00 0
Meda AB [200503] 275,29 160,00 2,0150 % 33,0 % 0,19367589 3,83834473 3,69320484 115,92 0,00060 0,71428571 1 498,36 47,60 % 713,22 1,00 713
Meda AB [200511] 136,71 60,00 1,5113 % 46,4 % 0,19367589 4,15095051 3,94682904 76,89 0,00011 0,6 2 647,54 2,50 % 66,19 1,00 66
Meda AB [200811] 49,79 35,00 3,4502 % 41,8 % 0,16600791 2,18604646 2,01556549 15,03 0,04567 0,85714286 1 690 074,96 74,08 % 1 251 995,31 1,00 1 251 995
Medivir B [201005] 127,31 62,00 0,2303 % 34,7 % 0,24110672 4,30614422 4,13555505 65,34 0,00004 0,8 166,30 65,51 % 108,95 1,00 109
Micronic Mydata AB [201005] 14,80 7,50 0,2303 % 56,7 % 0,22529644 2,6612106 2,39195339 7,31 0,00519 0,66666667 113 009,89 32,68 % 36 932,66 1,00 36 933
Midelfart Sonesson [200701] 24,30 13,00 2,9425 % 35,0 % 0,30039526 3,40471764 3,21296423 11,42 0,00042 0,66666667 4 921,23 53,83 % 2 649,02 1,00 2 649
Midelfart Sonesson [200912] 8,00 3,50 0,1802 % 36,0 % 0,23715415 4,80328031 4,62790222 4,50 0,00000 0,6 4,77 54,20 % 2,59 1,00 3
Morphic Technologies B [200810] 10,16 2,40 4,5557 % 62,7 % 0,17391304 5,67599141 5,41432268 7,78 0,00000 0,5 0,26 76,79 % 0,20 1,00 0
Nordea [200904] 42,52 20,75 0,5043 % 26,3 % 0,09486166 8,91333044 8,83240857 21,78 0,00000 0,64516129 0,00 63,76 % 0,00 1,00 0
Nordic Mines [200806] 29,64 26,00 4,1925 % 31,7 % 0,19367589 1,0683874 0,92890016 4,18 0,32167 0,77777778 1 293 815,98 64,43 % 833 669,67 1,00 833 670
Nordic Mines [201002] 31,86 20,00 0,1802 % 56,2 % 0,18181818 2,06476745 1,82528303 11,92 0,05906 0,90909091 124 937,19 83,47 % 104 288,36 1,00 104 288
NOTE [201005] 17,17 4,50 0,2002 % 48,3 % 0,24505929 5,71784894 5,47853376 12,67 0,00000 0,33333333 0,02 67,24 % 0,02 1,00 0
Opcon AB [200810] 33,19 18,00 4,6342 % 54,0 % 0,09486166 3,7923049 3,62612819 15,27 0,00010 0,8 329,10 47,95 % 157,79 1,00 158
101
Company S K r Volatility T-t d1 d2 Call Put Lambda Tot Put Underwriting ratio Adjusted Put FX PUT SEK
PA Resources [201006] 16,04 3,75 0,2904 % 72,3 % 0,16205534 5,13840155 4,84716787 12,30 0,00000 0,26315789 15,36 97,36 % 14,96 1,00 15
Precise Biometrics [200612] 5,36 3,50 2,8087 % 88,6 % 0,18181818 1,33219988 0,95450302 1,98 0,10152 0,75 1 850 619,77 91,79 % 1 698 661,26 1,00 1 698 661
RnB Retail Brands [200809] 13,81 6,15 4,5474 % 63,4 % 0,1027668 4,10084396 3,89744614 7,69 0,00001 0,5 380,97 62,19 % 236,94 1,00 237
RnB Retail Brands [200910] 6,22 6,00 0,1201 % 77,0 % 0,11857708 0,26746257 0,00246736 0,76 0,54048 0,875 7 712 457,56 38,36 % 2 958 498,72 1,00 2 958 499
Rottneros [200912] 2,50 0,25 0,1802 % 42,7 % 0,15810277 13,6387053 13,468828 2,25 0,00000 0,16666667 0,00 76,50 % 0,00 1,00 0
Rörvik Timber B [201004] 6,53 0,50 0,2202 % 64,3 % 0,2687747 7,87267101 7,53907886 6,03 0,00000 0,02702703 0,00 100,00 % 0,00 1,00 0
SAS [200904] 20,70 2,63 0,5023 % 55,5 % 0,09881423 11,9094513 11,7348865 18,07 0,00000 0,06666667 0,00 42,44 % 0,00 1,00 0
SAS [201004] 2,66 0,67 0,2503 % 65,0 % 0,09486166 6,99433202 6,79425978 1,99 0,00000 0,25 0,00 42,44 % 0,00 1,00 0
SEB A [200903] 37,62 10,00 1,1890 % 38,9 % 0,19762846 7,75729502 7,5842756 27,64 0,00000 0,3125 0,00 49,41 % 0,00 1,00 0
Swedbank A [200812] 58,72 48,00 3,3985 % 24,6 % 0,19762846 1,95948787 1,85009991 11,11 0,06312 0,66666667 10 843 178,69 59,18 % 6 417 446,61 1,00 6 417 447
Swedbank A [200910] 78,39 39,00 0,1201 % 53,9 % 0,09486166 4,29198646 4,12610759 39,39 0,00003 0,66666667 6 531,62 72,32 % 4 723,47 1,00 4 723
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum [200912] 56,04 15,00 0,2002 % 28,0 % 0,22134387 10,0671209 9,93528886 41,05 0,00000 0,33333333 0,00 79,37 % 0,00 1,00 0
SwitchCore [201002] 0,03 0,02 0,1501 % 83,2 % 0,30039526 1,44527896 0,9890514 0,02 0,00064 0,16666667 330 666,92 100,00 % 330 666,92 1,00 330 667
TradeDoubler [200912] 56,58 25,00 0,2002 % 58,2 % 0,17391304 3,4858983 3,24300819 31,59 0,00090 0,66666667 8 558,44 33,74 % 2 887,74 1,00 2 888
Trelleborg [200905] 29,35 12,00 0,2553 % 47,8 % 0,22924901 4,02295796 3,79398767 17,36 0,00005 0,33333333 2 747,07 65,67 % 1 803,87 1,00 1 804
ÅF Group [200608] 135,07 93,00 2,2448 % 26,5 % 0,22529644 3,07490736 2,94932633 42,55 0,00513 0,8 13 268,26 77,11 % 10 231,77 1,00 10 232
AGR Group [200909] 6,93 3,20 1,6293 % 78,6 % 0,09486166 3,31824231 3,07608267 3,73 0,00021 0,56562366 6 556,12 100,00 % 6 556,12 1,19 7 831
Aker Seafoods [200909] 7,12 5,00 1,4561 % 57,8 % 0,14229249 1,73757006 1,519438 2,16 0,02812 0,57471264 581 717,13 88,89 % 517 081,89 1,17 607 054
Apptix [200803] 1,98 0,50 1,4250 % 59,6 % 0,29644269 4,41877909 4,09421822 1,48 0,00000 0,31229412 12,39 100,00 % 12,39 1,18 15
Apptix [200910] 1,60 1,00 5,4263 % 66,1 % 0,17786561 1,85568916 1,57679827 0,61 0,00612 0,76405985 140 337,34 100,00 % 140 337,34 1,19 167 001
DnB NOR [200912] 63,09 47,30 1,5983 % 40,9 % 0,30434783 1,41116343 1,1855363 16,58 0,55930 0,81818182 135 518 373,31 66,00 % 89 442 126,23 1,19 106 033 641
EDB Ergogroup [201012] 17,86 9,45 2,2215 % 42,6 % 0,16205534 3,81542789 3,64376618 8,45 0,00005 0,64516129 3 111,11 32,79 % 1 020,06 1,14 1 165
Electromagnetic Geoservices [200809] 28,45 15,14 6,0821 % 79,5 % 0,22134387 1,91020308 1,53627776 13,65 0,13144 0,81886669 1 777 315,40 100,00 % 1 777 315,40 1,18 2 097 232
Green Reefers [200701] 4,43 4,39 3,7272 % 46,5 % 0,15019763 0,16890127 -0,0111446 0,35 0,28514 0,83333333 6 665 397,02 100,00 % 6 665 397,01 1,12 7 448 581
Hurtigruten [200710] 48,92 38,00 4,9032 % 25,5 % 0,14624506 2,71384478 2,61639887 11,19 0,00497 0,71225071 27 926,81 100,00 % 27 926,81 1,18 33 023
Kverneland [200512] 79,03 66,00 2,3060 % 32,5 % 0,19367589 1,36381889 1,22092824 13,80 0,47561 0,80362131 1 158 222,40 100,00 % 1 158 222,40 1,22 1 415 927
Navamedic [200709] 46,48 44,90 4,8639 % 51,0 % 0,14624506 0,31131901 0,11609455 4,57 2,67112 0,87022738 2 070 806,40 100,00 % 2 070 806,39 1,17 2 430 091
NorDiag [200807] 2,88 2,00 5,9736 % 50,7 % 0,14229249 2,04151446 1,8503033 0,90 0,00446 0,60518034 40 805,86 100,00 % 40 805,86 1,17 47 865
Norsk Hydro [201007] 45,68 26,30 2,2628 % 44,1 % 0,2687747 2,55390712 2,32511758 19,56 0,01898 0,76666667 5 544 136,01 56,59 % 3 137 622,64 1,23 3 848 294
Norske Skog [200510] 108,23 70,00 2,1152 % 32,2 % 0,14624506 3,62263522 3,49939802 38,45 0,00049 0,7 19 473,39 100,00 % 19 473,39 1,19 23 154
Norwegian Air Shuttle [200808] 49,09 34,80 6,1556 % 64,0 % 0,19367589 1,40351923 1,1216682 15,26 0,56667 0,64479937 4 199 888,05 100,00 % 4 199 888,05 1,18 4 951 668
Norwegian Property [200807] 33,53 26,00 5,9354 % 38,1 % 0,16205534 1,79757511 1,6441771 7,86 0,07816 0,52312828 3 931 356,20 100,00 % 3 931 356,20 1,18 4 642 932
Oceanteam [200909] 1,96 1,85 1,5621 % 95,7 % 0,16600791 0,34907969 -0,0406958 0,35 0,24024 0,34083258 2 411 505,32 100,00 % 2 411 505,33 1,18 2 841 959
PCI Biotech Holding [201006] 40,43 40,00 2,1454 % 97,8 % 0,19367589 0,24976351 -0,180696 7,14 6,54477 0,70651406 10 403 934,26 100,00 % 10 403 934,26 1,22 12 640 780
PhotoCure [200602] 48,37 46,00 2,2751 % 60,4 % 0,19367589 0,33879909 0,07288284 6,37 3,79661 0,8 13 352 075,12 99,89 % 13 337 658,16 1,18 15 725 099
Renewable Energy Corporation [200907] 58,10 26,50 1,3428 % 80,2 % 0,08300395 3,51688253 3,28577998 31,63 0,00078 0,74358974 98 445,15 100,00 % 98 445,15 1,24 121 777
Renewable Energy Corporation [201005] 24,85 12,10 1,9777 % 77,0 % 0,20158103 2,26467716 1,91878411 12,83 0,03914 0,66666667 8 673 291,03 100,00 % 8 673 291,03 1,21 10 520 702
Repant [200706] 8,77 6,00 4,4782 % 49,0 % 0,18577075 1,94178113 1,73045172 2,84 0,01981 0,45054949 35 693,21 100,00 % 35 693,21 1,13 40 155
Repant [200806] 2,29 1,50 5,1997 % 65,3 % 0,32806324 1,36306669 0,98910163 0,85 0,04001 0,5 435 512,86 100,00 % 435 512,86 1,17 508 679
Repant [200910] 1,00 0,65 1,6353 % 110,2 % 0,16600791 1,19787931 0,7490673 0,39 0,03121 0,80743323 1 726 785,59 67,36 % 1 163 233,66 1,19 1 385 993
Schibsted [201007] 128,30 34,00 2,2994 % 53,3 % 0,08300395 8,73751926 8,58396039 94,37 0,00000 0,625 0,00 100,00 % 0,00 1,22 0
Siem Offshore [200706] 14,42 13,00 4,6582 % 37,3 % 0,04743083 1,34374191 1,26248738 1,50 0,05023 0,7518797 2 113 990,97 100,00 % 2 113 990,97 1,15 2 438 489
Storebrand [200712] 78,83 45,00 5,2199 % 29,1 % 0,18577075 4,61610994 4,49086213 34,26 0,00000 0,55 435,15 100,00 % 435,15 1,19 517
TTS Marine [200907] 13,72 6,00 1,4777 % 60,7 % 0,19367589 3,24156847 2,97461181 7,73 0,00062 0,38151879 9 979,23 100,00 % 9 979,23 1,18 11 820
Bang & Olufsen B [200905] 84,79 19,00 2,0712 % 40,5 % 0,08300395 12,8879712 12,7712523 65,82 0,00000 0,33333333 0,00 74,30 % 0,00 1,46 0
Brøndby IF B [200712] 85,32 60,00 4,7284 % 24,3 % 0,09486166 4,79897171 4,72408787 25,59 0,00000 0,66666667 1,17 100,00 % 1,17 1,24 1
Carlsberg B [200806] 660,24 400,00 4,9695 % 19,5 % 0,1027668 8,14536932 8,08297811 262,28 0,00000 0,5 0,00 100,00 % 0,00 1,25 0
H+H International [200912] 227,98 54,00 1,0555 % 44,1 % 0,19367589 7,53428781 7,34035707 174,09 0,00000 0,11111111 0,00 82,78 % 0,00 1,40 0
NeuroSearch [200610] 170,65 100,00 3,5206 % 57,1 % 0,09881423 3,08595903 2,90642236 71,01 0,00904 0,66666667 23 921,83 100,00 % 23 921,83 1,24 29 687
TK Development [201008] 35,07 15,00 0,7025 % 66,3 % 0,49407115 2,06262627 1,59648818 20,26 0,13848 0,66666667 1 294 472,10 72,41 % 937 292,40 1,29 1 212 856
Vestas Wind Systems [200406] 86,34 50,00 2,1733 % 63,4 % 0,11067194 2,70654187 2,49560404 36,48 0,02010 0,75 659 224,47 100,00 % 659 224,47 1,23 812 494
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Appendix 6: Risk days on fee









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 9,90288E-05 9,90288E-05 0,186941664 0,666414671
Residual 99 0,052443353 0,000529731
Total 100 0,052542382
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept 0,038000537 0,0055026 6,905923768 4,84558E-10 0,027082185 0,048918889 0,027082185 0,048918889
X Variable 1 -4,44362E-05 0,000102774 -0,43236751 0,666414671 -0,000248363 0,00015949 -0,000248363 0,00015949
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Appendix 7: Pre-Binding dummy regressed on fee








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0,004922458 0,004922458 10,23360261 0,001852874
Residual 99 0,047619924 0,000481009
Total 100 0,052542382
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept 0,026456529 0,003655321 7,237813182 9,8943E-11 0,01920358 0,033709479 0,01920358 0,033709479
Pre-Binding 0,014576182 0,00455648 3,199000251 0,001852874 0,005535137 0,023617227 0,005535137 0,023617227
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Appendix 8: Full volatility table for issues with 5 years of data.
Monthly
Company 100 D 200 D 300 D </= 5Y 52 W 104 W 156 W 208 W </= 5Y 12 M 24 M 36 M 48 M </= 5Y
A-Com 110,8 % 94,1 % 80,5 % 55,4 % 80,0 % 62,4 % 53,9 % 49,0 % 47,7 % 60,6 % 46,2 % 41,2 % 41,1 % 39,3 %
A-Com 39,9 % 72,2 % 86,4 % 56,2 % 62,1 % 58,6 % 51,4 % 48,6 % 45,6 % 37,6 % 42,7 % 38,1 % 40,0 % 39,6 %
Active Biotech 62,2 % 53,3 % 46,6 % 59,4 % 55,1 % 45,6 % 46,5 % 56,1 % 65,6 % 31,7 % 34,7 % 44,1 % 59,2 % 59,5 %
Active Biotech 37,4 % 35,0 % 33,2 % 48,5 % 31,5 % 43,4 % 41,9 % 53,6 % 55,3 % 28,7 % 29,0 % 33,0 % 37,2 % 50,1 %
Active Biotech 51,4 % 54,4 % 51,7 % 43,0 % 49,0 % 40,1 % 45,5 % 43,0 % 42,7 % 61,9 % 45,5 % 54,5 % 50,9 % 48,5 %
Billerud 77,9 % 72,6 % 67,8 % 41,9 % 90,0 % 68,5 % 57,5 % 52,3 % 48,9 % 103,4 % 76,9 % 63,9 % 58,5 % 53,7 %
BioPhausia 36,9 % 47,2 % 50,2 % 62,6 % 52,8 % 52,3 % 50,2 % 55,4 % 60,2 % 27,9 % 47,6 % 41,9 % 52,7 % 52,3 %
Boliden 36,0 % 38,9 % 41,5 % 55,1 % 45,8 % 54,9 % 68,4 % 65,0 % 61,4 % 33,9 % 67,9 % 70,2 % 64,8 % 62,4 %
Cision 39,9 % 38,7 % 54,3 % 59,2 % 55,2 % 100,9 % 84,1 % 75,7 % 69,1 % 51,9 % 94,9 % 79,8 % 71,4 % 66,3 %
Cybercom Group 70,4 % 75,9 % 66,6 % 45,9 % 64,4 % 56,4 % 50,1 % 45,6 % 42,6 % 64,0 % 59,4 % 54,5 % 48,9 % 45,5 %
Diamyd Medical 47,9 % 54,5 % 52,8 % 58,7 % 66,3 % 56,3 % 66,0 % 63,8 % 59,1 % 39,3 % 43,4 % 72,3 % 68,3 % 62,7 %
Digital Vision 54,1 % 68,3 % 70,2 % 86,7 % 54,5 % 114,6 % 98,8 % 91,1 % 84,0 % 62,0 % 136,8 % 115,6 % 103,4 % 93,9 %
Elanders 43,1 % 39,1 % 50,4 % 44,3 % 37,1 % 66,1 % 55,4 % 49,9 % 46,0 % 38,3 % 57,9 % 49,0 % 46,1 % 42,8 %
Elanders 25,2 % 29,6 % 28,0 % 37,3 % 26,9 % 27,4 % 28,2 % 30,0 % 36,5 % 19,0 % 23,6 % 23,7 % 27,4 % 37,8 %
Eniro 98,9 % 83,3 % 74,4 % 42,9 % 84,6 % 64,3 % 54,7 % 48,8 % 44,8 % 73,6 % 57,7 % 51,5 % 47,4 % 44,8 %
Eniro 110,5 % 98,6 % 83,0 % 65,1 % 101,3 % 105,1 % 91,0 % 79,6 % 72,3 % 87,0 % 117,4 % 99,3 % 86,8 % 79,5 %
Fingerprint Cards 66,0 % 96,1 % 92,9 % 86,3 % 116,5 % 96,0 % 91,2 % 90,5 % 88,3 % 119,9 % 87,9 % 97,5 % 92,7 % 90,6 %
Fingerprint Cards 74,1 % 60,5 % 71,7 % 80,3 % 86,5 % 83,9 % 84,8 % 85,4 % 81,9 % 50,5 % 75,3 % 84,6 % 86,7 % 80,3 %
Fingerprint Cards 79,8 % 70,1 % 74,7 % 87,7 % 89,8 % 87,5 % 83,7 % 82,6 % 83,4 % 84,9 % 86,9 % 82,8 % 84,9 % 88,0 %
Getinge 28,3 % 25,5 % 26,3 % 25,7 % 23,3 % 22,1 % 20,5 % 20,4 % 22,1 % 18,9 % 21,4 % 20,1 % 20,3 % 21,5 %
Geveko 33,7 % 31,7 % 37,2 % 35,7 % 28,1 % 33,2 % 31,6 % 30,0 % 28,0 % 32,0 % 36,2 % 36,0 % 34,5 % 31,9 %
Gunnebo 40,8 % 45,8 % 58,2 % 39,1 % 55,4 % 56,9 % 49,3 % 44,2 % 41,8 % 78,5 % 63,7 % 54,1 % 49,0 % 45,2 %
Haldex 41,0 % 59,0 % 65,3 % 40,7 % 57,2 % 64,1 % 55,2 % 50,6 % 45,9 % 77,0 % 76,6 % 64,2 % 58,1 % 53,6 %
Hexagon 37,3 % 34,6 % 43,6 % 48,6 % 36,4 % 60,5 % 55,7 % 50,6 % 48,4 % 21,6 % 68,3 % 57,8 % 52,5 % 51,1 %
Hexagon 26,7 % 28,5 % 27,1 % 28,9 % 28,7 % 28,3 % 25,9 % 29,2 % 28,4 % 17,6 % 24,5 % 22,7 % 29,5 % 28,2 %
Hexagon 25,4 % 33,4 % 32,4 % 30,3 % 30,3 % 25,7 % 25,6 % 29,8 % 28,8 % 31,0 % 23,6 % 22,0 % 25,4 % 24,6 %
Karo Bio 58,5 % 72,0 % 65,5 % 57,1 % 69,8 % 62,0 % 59,7 % 61,4 % 58,8 % 69,4 % 60,4 % 60,4 % 64,4 % 63,6 %
Karo Bio 39,1 % 55,1 % 58,2 % 54,9 % 53,1 % 54,2 % 58,4 % 55,9 % 56,1 % 48,9 % 56,4 % 64,0 % 64,0 % 63,0 %
Karo Bio 43,2 % 42,4 % 42,0 % 56,5 % 42,6 % 52,3 % 54,9 % 59,5 % 62,4 % 53,7 % 58,7 % 60,5 % 69,9 % 72,6 %
Meda 55,5 % 53,4 % 50,3 % 40,5 % 50,7 % 45,4 % 41,2 % 44,9 % 42,5 % 53,8 % 47,6 % 41,4 % 44,8 % 41,8 %
Meda 31,3 % 31,1 % 32,2 % 47,8 % 32,8 % 26,9 % 34,3 % 41,6 % 41,6 % 28,5 % 25,8 % 32,4 % 33,9 % 33,0 %
Meda 56,1 % 46,6 % 41,2 % 45,3 % 53,2 % 43,4 % 38,8 % 40,2 % 41,7 % 49,4 % 42,5 % 42,6 % 46,5 % 46,4 %
Medivir 41,6 % 39,3 % 38,9 % 38,5 % 35,3 % 33,7 % 33,3 % 39,2 % 38,7 % 30,7 % 34,9 % 32,3 % 36,0 % 34,7 %
Micronic Mydata 53,3 % 45,4 % 52,9 % 53,1 % 60,7 % 62,7 % 57,5 % 58,1 % 53,7 % 65,0 % 70,4 % 60,6 % 60,3 % 56,7 %
Midsona 29,9 % 33,7 % 31,9 % 45,3 % 30,7 % 33,5 % 33,2 % 35,1 % 35,6 % 36,8 % 34,1 % 37,8 % 34,2 % 35,0 %
Midsona 46,5 % 53,4 % 66,5 % 45,3 % 51,5 % 45,1 % 44,8 % 41,9 % 41,1 % 49,7 % 39,1 % 38,5 % 36,9 % 36,0 %
Nordea 76,7 % 65,3 % 57,6 % 33,2 % 51,5 % 41,2 % 35,7 % 32,1 % 29,9 % 41,6 % 33,2 % 30,9 % 28,0 % 26,3 %




Company 100 D 200 D 300 D </= 5Y 52 W 104 W 156 W 208 W </= 5Y 12 M 24 M 36 M 48 M </= 5Y
Opcon 49,7 % 47,7 % 45,4 % 51,7 % 46,0 % 43,3 % 51,6 % 51,8 % 51,6 % 37,2 % 39,0 % 56,9 % 54,2 % 54,0 %
PA Resources 43,3 % 40,4 % 50,5 % 63,7 % 50,2 % 75,3 % 66,4 % 62,5 % 66,5 % 54,3 % 79,9 % 70,0 % 63,8 % 72,3 %
Precise Biometrics62,5 % 55,8 % 52,6 % 86,4 % 58,1 % 62,9 % 60,9 % 69,6 % 76,5 % 51,2 % 53,8 % 57,5 % 83,8 % 88,6 %
RnB Retail Brands 75,7 % 85,0 % 88,6 % 60,6 % 104,1 % 97,7 % 82,5 % 74,4 % 71,4 % 113,9 % 102,3 % 88,0 % 78,6 % 77,0 %
RnB Retail Brands 65,4 % 76,0 % 67,0 % 51,9 % 81,8 % 63,6 % 56,9 % 55,9 % 54,3 % 95,6 % 76,7 % 66,3 % 65,2 % 63,4 %
Rottneros 63,0 % 80,7 % 81,0 % 48,5 % 69,5 % 66,5 % 56,9 % 51,5 % 47,0 % 59,7 % 59,8 % 49,9 % 46,7 % 42,7 %
Rörvik Timber 58,3 % 76,9 % 103,4 % 65,8 % 100,7 % 90,4 % 80,3 % 73,1 % 67,1 % 79,5 % 82,4 % 77,1 % 70,1 % 64,3 %
SAS 82,8 % 92,3 % 80,8 % 49,6 % 86,5 % 69,7 % 59,8 % 54,6 % 51,0 % 94,2 % 76,1 % 66,4 % 59,4 % 55,5 %
SAS 64,6 % 55,3 % 73,9 % 58,0 % 66,8 % 87,3 % 75,1 % 67,6 % 61,5 % 74,2 % 89,2 % 76,8 % 70,0 % 65,0 %
SEB 112,7 % 86,8 % 75,3 % 42,1 % 83,8 % 62,9 % 53,6 % 47,2 % 43,0 % 73,9 % 55,8 % 47,8 % 42,5 % 38,9 %
Swedbank 85,9 % 66,6 % 58,3 % 33,9 % 40,1 % 34,0 % 31,7 % 28,4 % 26,1 % 38,0 % 32,1 % 29,1 % 26,5 % 24,6 %
Swedbank 75,2 % 84,4 % 90,0 % 49,7 % 102,5 % 77,7 % 64,8 % 57,2 % 51,6 % 107,5 % 80,4 % 66,9 % 59,2 % 53,9 %
SwitchCore 243,0 % 267,1 % 229,8 % 141,8 % 144,7 % 116,2 % 121,3 % 108,4 % 99,8 % 107,5 % 84,4 % 96,6 % 85,5 % 83,2 %
Trelleborg 76,5 % 70,5 % 61,8 % 39,0 % 74,8 % 59,6 % 53,2 % 48,1 % 44,2 % 83,5 % 62,7 % 56,6 % 51,3 % 47,8 %
ÅF Group 40,6 % 32,1 % 30,0 % 29,6 % 31,5 % 25,8 % 26,0 % 25,6 % 25,1 % 28,1 % 25,1 % 25,6 % 27,0 % 26,5 %
CTT Systems 34,2 % 57,7 % 53,6 % 81,9 % 44,6 % 50,8 % 78,5 % 71,0 % 73,0 % 38,5 % 75,2 % 65,7 % 61,8 % 64,7 %
IBS 36,4 % 39,9 % 35,7 % 39,2 % 36,3 % 39,8 % 34,8 % 41,9 % 43,6 % 29,8 % 34,5 % 31,9 % 37,3 % 40,4 %
Aker Seafoods 88,7 % 77,2 % 78,7 % 55,2 % 96,7 % 73,3 % 65,2 % 59,5 % 58,8 % 101,4 % 73,7 % 64,5 % 57,7 % 57,8 %
Apptix 47,1 % 84,8 % 89,3 % 68,3 % 90,2 % 84,4 % 71,3 % 68,4 % 65,8 % 66,7 % 74,9 % 65,5 % 65,5 % 66,1 %
Apptix 83,4 % 65,4 % 58,6 % 59,0 % 70,1 % 57,5 % 59,2 % 58,7 % 62,6 % 63,5 % 53,2 % 53,6 % 53,8 % 59,6 %
DnB NOR 56,4 % 76,6 % 87,9 % 47,3 % 97,3 % 70,4 % 58,4 % 51,4 % 46,6 % 85,2 % 60,4 % 50,0 % 44,7 % 40,9 %
Green Reefers 32,2 % 35,3 % 35,5 % 64,1 % 23,9 % 31,4 % 48,1 % 55,3 % 58,1 % 27,6 % 31,3 % 41,5 % 48,6 % 46,5 %
Hurtigruten 30,5 % 34,6 % 38,1 % 36,1 % 31,9 % 31,5 % 30,7 % 29,1 % 28,7 % 27,9 % 26,1 % 26,2 % 25,8 % 25,5 %
Kverneland 31,8 % 27,7 % 30,4 % 33,4 % 21,7 % 24,7 % 25,9 % 28,2 % 30,6 % 18,8 % 23,5 % 22,9 % 27,5 % 32,5 %
Norsk Hydro 31,9 % 35,6 % 43,5 % 47,8 % 39,7 % 53,8 % 50,4 % 48,4 % 44,9 % 37,6 % 59,2 % 49,5 % 46,4 % 44,1 %
Norske Skog 28,2 % 25,6 % 24,1 % 31,8 % 25,9 % 26,4 % 30,8 % 31,4 % 32,8 % 30,3 % 29,3 % 30,3 % 32,4 % 32,2 %
Norwegian Air Shuttle46,7 % 46,7 % 41,8 % 47,9 % 49,1 % 42,1 % 49,2 % 51,5 % 54,4 % 49,5 % 42,4 % 52,5 % 56,3 % 64,0 %
PhotoCure 37,7 % 35,3 % 38,6 % 55,1 % 33,5 % 34,4 % 44,1 % 51,9 % 52,9 % 35,7 % 39,9 % 52,0 % 62,2 % 60,4 %
Schibsted 42,5 % 43,6 % 53,6 % 47,3 % 44,4 % 62,3 % 55,2 % 49,5 % 45,5 % 37,7 % 72,9 % 65,3 % 58,2 % 53,3 %
Storebrand 30,9 % 29,8 % 28,5 % 31,2 % 27,8 % 28,3 % 28,6 % 27,0 % 29,3 % 23,8 % 27,0 % 26,6 % 26,8 % 29,1 %
TTS Marine 56,1 % 79,8 % 68,3 % 46,0 % 69,8 % 61,4 % 56,7 % 51,7 % 49,4 % 100,5 % 82,1 % 72,7 % 64,5 % 60,7 %
EDB Ergogroup 50,1 % 50,2 % 48,2 % 43,9 % 38,9 % 49,5 % 51,7 % 45,9 % 42,5 % 22,6 % 48,9 % 51,4 % 45,4 % 42,6 %
Bang & Olufsen 87,1 % 76,6 % 67,1 % 42,1 % 72,4 % 60,8 % 52,0 % 47,6 % 44,0 % 53,7 % 50,5 % 45,3 % 43,9 % 40,5 %
Brøndby IF 37,8 % 32,8 % 30,1 % 36,6 % 29,8 % 29,9 % 28,2 % 28,0 % 29,3 % 25,2 % 27,5 % 25,3 % 24,4 % 24,3 %
Carlsberg 36,4 % 31,9 % 29,2 % 23,3 % 26,3 % 22,7 % 21,4 % 20,9 % 20,7 % 27,1 % 23,3 % 20,8 % 19,7 % 19,5 %
H+H International94,5 % 84,2 % 85,5 % 50,7 % 88,2 % 77,8 % 66,8 % 58,7 % 54,3 % 64,2 % 53,1 % 51,9 % 46,9 % 44,1 %
NeuroSearch 36,1 % 30,7 % 64,3 % 54,3 % 26,9 % 46,4 % 41,0 % 51,6 % 55,7 % 25,2 % 51,4 % 49,5 % 55,7 % 57,1 %
TK Development 43,1 % 40,6 % 50,8 % 57,1 % 42,1 % 74,3 % 65,0 % 61,1 % 59,2 % 53,5 % 80,1 % 70,1 % 64,5 % 66,3 %
Vestas Wind Systems35,7 % 54,6 % 55,2 % 61,4 % 57,9 % 66,4 % 64,7 % 65,3 % 64,6 % 64,0 % 68,6 % 65,5 % 60,3 % 63,4 %

